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After forty years of independence, African countries are still battling with the 
problem of nation building. There is widespread political instability and caused by 
ethnic conflicts. This thesis examines the possibility of the military playing a direct 
role in ethnic integration. The variables, which may determine the military's ability to 
effect national integration, are the political elite, the state and society. It is found that 
at lower levels of development, these variables do not support the military in the 
direction of national integration but they do so at higher levels of development. The 
issue which arises from this finding is whether African countries should wait for the 
level of development to eventually rise in the hope that it will bring national 
integration with it. They can not wait because without some form of consensus 
within countries, mistrust tensions and conflicts will weak.en the thrust to 
development, which is the necessary ingredient for national integration. African 
countries should therefore find methods of political organization, which reduce such 
tensions and conflicts in order to facilitate development and consequently archive 
national integration. It is this need for stability that the culturally adaptive mode of 
political organization is recommended for African countries. 
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This thesis is about whether the military can be an instrument of national 
integration in an ethnically divided society. If the military were to be such an instrument, 
it would have to be internally integrated so that it can influence society in the direction of 
national integration. Given its position in the state, the military's ability to accomplish 
this task will depend on the behavior of the political elite, the state and the society. The 
evidence shows that the level of development of the above mentioned variables is 
important for the out come of such a task. When a country is at a low level of 
development, the political elite utilizes ethnicity for political survival. This elite wants to 
change the composition of the military to reflect its conceptualization of the security of its 
ethnic group. The state and its institutions including the military are too weak to protect 
their corporate interests and independently influence society. The political behavior of 
society is influenced by patron client linkages, which cause more suspicion between the 
ethnic groups. These patterns of behavior by the elite, the state and the society are not 
observed at higher levels of development. 
For an institution like the military to succeed as an instrument of national 
integration, a higher level of socio-economic transformation should have taken place. A 
question arises as to the role of institutions such as the military in national integration at a 
high level of socio economic development. Since at that level, socio-economic 
transformation would have created horizontal and vertical linkages which are inherently 
integrative it may look as though institutions do not have much to do. The finding that 
xi 
institutions are very effective in national integration at high level of development should 
make them effective in integrating previously neglected groups and minorities. The 
developed structures should make it easier to do this. 
The conclusion is that the military can be an instrument of national integration 
depending upon the level of socio-economic development of the country. Such a 
conclusion does not mean very much since the ethic tensions, which are common within 
African states, are blocking efforts to socio-economic development. The immediate 
requirement is a type of national organization, which reduces suspicion and tensions in 
African polities so that an environment, which creates conditions for development, may 
exist. There should be an alternative form of organization which removes the mistrust by 
those ethnic groups without political power who feel that those in power want to 
dominate culturally and economically. Nation building through the model of cultural 
displacement in underdeveloped countries created high levels of mistrust and tension. It · 
is possible that the high values of the military could still be useful for national integration 
at low levels of development if a different form of organization with more trust is 
followed. Looking at the problem from this perspective, one can vision the military being 
effective at all levels of socio- economic development. 
xii 
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I. ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When colonialism in Africa collapsed beginning with the independence of Ghana 
in 1957, it was clear that the new nations would begin a long journey of nation building. 
As each country assumed independence, there were confident calls for national unity in 
the independence speeches. Forty years have passed, and a lot of blood has been spilt in 
north, south, west and central Africa over ethnicity related issues. 
The lack of nationally unifying principles has manifested itself in several ways. 
First, there arose disagreements between the elite over the direction of political change 
such as the division of power between the center and the regions. This issue has caused 
civil wars in Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia and Nigeria. Second, each time a political leader has 
a political base by which he claims leadership to the whole country, that base is ethnic in 
character. Third, in some African countries, regional elites and the traditional leadership 
Q.ave cooperated in their claims of supremacy over the whole national polity. In Nigeria 
for example, the traditional leadership in the north of the country successfully 
incorporated the new elite in the Northern Peoples Congress to create a bureaucracy that 
they employed as a bulwark for control of the federation. I In other parts of Africa too, 
national unity policies were centered on the distribution of posts in the bureaucracy 
following the ethnic distribution of state power. These policies made it easier for the 
1 Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic (New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 301. 
1 
opposition to mobilize around the neglected ethnic groups. It could be argued that 
disagreements over these issues led to one party states, dictatorships and ethnic cliques 
whose political practices were a mere supplant of the previous colonial governors and 
their bureaucracies. In these cases they represented a fonn of internal colonialism. 
Osei-Kwame notes that there is opposition to this internal colonialism by the 
rising middle class of young and upcoming intellectuals, professionals, students and 
workers who show that they are prepared to fight for a new independence. 2 The 
Movement for Multi-party Democracy in Zambia came on such a platfonn when it won 
elections in 1991. The current pro-democracy movement in Nigeria and various 
constitutior:ial conferences in other parts of Africa also indicate this trend. These events 
show that ethnicity is an important consideration in the nation . building efforts of the 
African state, and yet a successful model for national integration has not been found. The 
policy choice is whether to ignore cultural differences hoping that they will cease to be 
consequential, or to find some common ground on which the different ethnic groups can 
integrate. 
The post colonial period has seen the military being involved in the problems of 
national integration either in their security role or in a political role during those times 
when they are controlling the state. In either capacity, the military is an instrument that 
possesses a unique culture of camaraderie and patriotic values that enable it to have 
superior organization. The military organization is therefore capable of exercising 
2 Peter Osei-Kwame, A New Conceptual Model for the Study of Political Integration in Africa 
(Washington: University Press of America. 1980), 29. 
2 
bureaucratic impartiality more successfully than civilian organizations. Bureaucratic 
impartiality causes ethnic related tensions to be fewer in the military. Realizing this 
superior organization, some scholars have argued that the military could be utilized as an 
instrument of national integration.3 This study will establish the factors that may 
determine the success or failure of the military as an instrument of national integration by 
comparing the Nigerian and the South African military. It is important to stress that 
neither of the two militaries had made it official policy to be instruments of national 
integration. However, the manner in which both militaries approached ethnic issues 
indicated that there was an implied policy directed towards their role in national 
integration. This had to be because it was official policy for both states to achieve 
national integration. To do this, the state had to use its instruments of which the military 
is one. The study is therefore set in the context of state policy, the military's own 
behavior and the debate among scholars on the subject. 
This chapter will articulate the general problem of ethnic integration, examine 
how the literature views the manner in which ethnicity has been regarded in the polities of 
Africa, then discuss the theoretical approaches to the military's role in ethnic integration. 
There will be an assessment of the models of ethnic integration and the linkages between 
theory and how the militaries responded in view of the contemporary thinking on national 
integration. The remainder of the chapter describes the methodology of the study. 
3 Morris Janowitz, 17ie Military in the Political Development of New Nations: Essays in Comparative 
Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 75-106., S. E. Finer, 17ie Man on Horseback: 17ie 
Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), 110-128. 
3 
B. THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION 
1. The Concept of Nation 
The problem of national integration is found in the wider concept of the nation. It 
is therefore important to identify the component parts of society that can be integrated and 
the means by which the integration can occur. Today, African polities find themselves 
within borders that were arbitrarily drawn by the colonizing powers in Berlin in 1884. 
Various ethnic groups found themselves entrapped within borders, but they were 
expected thereafter to operate as singular nations despite the ab~ence of common cultural 
and historic bonds. Further to the already existing differences, most colonial powers 
encouraged ethnic divisions as instruments of control. Other powers like Portugal 
ignored ethnicity and adopted assimilation strategies for qualification to citizenship. 
Cultural and historic bonds are necessary for the "routinized affirmation of common 
sentiment" by nationals, a phenomena Emile Durkheim called the "conscience of the 
collective. "4 The feeling of common sentiments by nationals is the objective of the 
I?-ational integration strategies discussed in this study. In many ways colonization started 
the process of nation building in Africa, but it did so in a contradictory fashion. For 
control purposes they employed the divide and rule strategy to make colonization 
cheaper. Colonial authorities were not concerned with ethnic integration directly, but 
they pursued policies of absorption of Africans into the modem economy to meet their 
labor requirements. It is in the production relations that they introduced in mining, 
4 Quoted in Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn, ed .. Nation Building and the Politics of Nationalism 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), 4. 
4 
fanning and industry where contemporary African nationalism began. Contemporary 
African nationalism therefore emerges from the modernization process of western 
education, industrialization and urbanization. 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) which affirmed in 1963 that each 
country should build a nation around the existing borders was itself a product of the 
triumph of that nationalism. The OAU was actually affirming the modernization 
processes of colonialism as an asset on which future modernization might progress. It 
will be argued in this study that the formula for national integration lies in modernization, 
except that this time it must be modernization without colonization. 
It is important to understand that colonialism in Africa was a very short lived 
affair. After the second world war, a period of about 60 years from the time of the Berlin 
conference, colonization proper started to crumble and de-colonization took its place. 
This is a short time compared to the example of colonialism in the Americas. 
Essentially the nationalists who led their countries to independence still had their 
roots in the ethnically based peasant societies from which they had emerged. The 
modernizing aspects of colonialism had not destroyed the original ethnic communities. It 
means therefore that nation building strategies had to account for ethnic differences 
because the class based society had not yet been formed by the short lived "colonial 
enterprise." However colonialism had existed long enough to create the infrastructural 
basis of nations. The higher the level of development of the infrastructure left by 
colonialism, the better prepared such a country was for nation building. Clearly the OAU 
5 
based its policy of legitimizing these countries around the colonial borders because the 
nationalists in each country were confident they could build a nation. 
The existence of many ethnic groups within colonial borders is in itself not the 
main problem in nation building, but the lack of horizontal linkages in the form of social 
and economic interests that form the basis of classes was the main problem. In any case 
most nations were created on a multiethnic basis. The existence of stronger intra-ethnic 
bonds within underdeveloped societies brings challenges for the new political class in its 
nation building effort. The question is whether to adopt strategies which increase the 
horizontal linkages between the ethnic groups, rather than to adopt the easier route of 
exploiting ethnic differences. The majority of the African political class appear to have 
adopted this easier route. 
2. Modernization Theory 
Anthony Smith, who says that all nations have an ethnic origin, identifies two 
models by which the nation may be conceived to have emerged.s One model considers 
_the nation to be a modem phenomenon brought about by political actions of the modem 
ethnic elite, who rebel against cultural colonialism, or that it is the political 
entrepreneurship of the same elite, who use ethnicity as instruments for the struggle for 
wealth and power. Within the modernist concept of the origin of nations, Benedict 
Anderson says that· the nation is an imagined community because a nation comprises 
individuals who are sentimentally committed to each other and to that community, even 
5 Anthony D Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations (Camriridge: Blackwell Publishing Inc, 1986), 6-18. 
6 
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without necessarily knowing each other. This was made possible by the development of 
print language that was able to bring together a wide section of people around cultural 
symbols.6 For print capitalism to bind together many societies, it is important to have a 
high level of literacy. In many ways the modernist theory agrees with the source of 
African nationalism, which was the colonial elite who brought print capitalism and . 
through education, they created the African elite to which they handed over power during 
de-colonization. Education, which is a vital part of any modernization process is 
essential for national integration. Modernization processes such as the ones described 
above are expected to replace an ethnic culture with a national one in order to form the 
basis for national integration. 
Modernization theory suggests several methods by which ethnic culture can be 
displaced, through a process of de-tribalization, to a modem one that is applicable to all 
citizens. It is thought that modernization forces such as wage employment, urbanization, 
mass media, education or commercialization, tend to reduce ethnic conflict. Explaining 
modernization theory, Abner Cohen said that if two cultures interact in a political and 
economic system, people from either culture who face similar social challenges will find 
each other. This process weakens tribal alignments and they eventually disappear.7 
6 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the_ Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: New York: Verso, 1996), 134. 
7 Abner Cohen, ed., The Lesson of Ethnicity: Introduction in Urban Ethnicity (London: Tavistock 1974 ), 
22. 
7 
Cohen's thinking is challenged by Uchendu, who draws his criticism from the 
Nigerian experiences where he observes that " ... the new class-based socio-economic 
stratification is a cultural mask behind which lie deep seated tribal values which continue 
to influence the value systems of our elite."8 This observation suggests that the political 
class maintains essentially tribal values. The lack of integration in Africa is caused 
fundamentally by tribally based values, and the disuniting actions of the political elite is a 
symptom of the persistence of these basic value systems. For example, ethnic societies 
found in urban areas indicate a strong sense of ethnic community. Offering patronage, 
the political elite utilize these socio-political organizations to further their own political 
and economic interests. According to Uchendu's observation, the elite succeed in 
dividing the people because ethnic values are already deep seated. 
Another variant of the modernization model is the "political party brokerage 
thesis." The assumption behind such a strategy is that political parties in their effort to 
broaden the support base in order to win elections, will formulate ideologies which cut 
~cross parochial interests. It is observed that political parties can achieve this if there is 
no dominant ethnic group in the party. The higher the dominance, the less need for the 
dominant party to appeal to other ethnic groups.9 For example, the 1979 constitution for 
Nigerian transition to the second republic required that a presidential candidate had to get 
at least 25 percent of his votes from each of the states. The creation of the two party 
8 Victor Uchendu, The Passing a/Tribal Man: A West African Experience, in the Passing a/Tribal Man in 
Africa (Netherlands: E J Brill, 1970), 51-65. 
9 Robert Bates, "Ethnicity in Contemporary Africa," Eastern African Studies Series 14 (July 1973): 56. 
8 
system during the abortive transition under General Babangida in 1990, also followed this 
concept. 
Another possible strategy, suggested by Karl Deutsch, involves a four-stage 
concept that anticipated that political integration would take place through social 
mobilization and assimilation. The first stage is characterized by open or hidden 
resistance to integration; the next stage is passive compliance at the state's urging; the 
third is active support for a common state, but with continuing ethnic or cultural group 
cohesion; and the fourth stage is the integration at the language and cultural levels.10 
Deutsch's concept is useful in that it can give us indicators as to whether national 
integration policies are succeeding or failing, and therefore requiring policy re-evaluation. 
This concept is also useful for showing that national integration is a process, and the 
process is complete when cultural displacement has occurred. The concept suggests that 
the staie should be the active argent of integration especially in the first and second stages 
of the process. However, no time scale is given for each stage, nor are indicators for the 
end or the beginning of each stage. The final stage of Deutsch's model has not been 
observed to occur anywhere, including in developed countries. 
The detribalization concept, the party brokerage, and the state-assisted stages 
suggested by Deutsch all fall under the modernization theory of national building in 
ethnically divided countries. Modernization theory supports intervention through an 
external stimulus such as a political party, or some other organ of the state that could 
10 Karl Deutsch and William Foltz, eds., Nation Building (New York: 1966) 8-9, adapted from Peter Osei-
Kwame, A New Conceptual Model for the study of Political Integration in Africa, 34 
9 
include the military. The removal of colonial institutions of modernization means that 
the success of such a strategy depends upon how society responds to an internally 
designed modernizer, as opposed to one working from without such as a colonial power. 
Modernization or cultural displacement strategies have not been successful in 
integrating African communities, but it is important to assess whether this is because the· 
strategies were poor or the society was not responsive to these strategies. Before 
proceeding to that part of the analysis, we need to consider another theory of national 
integration. 
3. Primordial Theory 
While modernization theory essentially posits a model of cultural displacement, 
other scholars have argued for a model of cultural adaptation. The theory of origin of the 
nations says that ethnicity is an extension of kinship, and a vehicle for the pursuit of 
collective goals. Ethnicity is therefore "natural, universal and perennial" and in that sense 
the origin of nations is primordial.11 If the origin of nations is primordial, then current 
$trategies of nation building by African polities, which are supported by the OAU, should 
be reversed so that borders are redrawn to match ethnic boundaries inside which nations 
will emerge. However, no nation in the world emerged in this way or resembles ethnic 
purity of this sort. Nations are artificial constructs, built out of a process of integration. 
11 Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations, I 2. 
IO 
4. Integrated Theory 
Anthony Smith therefore argues for a view of the nation that accepts a bit of both 
the modernization theories discussed in the last section and the primordial theories of the 
origin of nations. From the modernization theory he accepts that ethnic structures may be 
changed by social mobilization, a factor which endorses the strategies of the elite in 
nation formation in Africa. From the primordialists he accepts that the core values that 
attach the individual to the community change more slowly. He explains that the 
"historical memories" and central values, which he describes as a complex of myths and 
symbols, are diffused thro].lgh a given population and transmitted to future generations. 
In other words, the changing ethnic structures carry the old values with them. That 
probably explains the observed behavior of communities found in new social structures 
such as in urban settings, immigrants or refugees, who continue to associate in their in 
their ethnic communities even after living in multi-ethnic environment for many years. 
The model of integration suggested by the acceptance of the integrated theory of the 
formation of nations is cultural adaptation, a model that is opposed to the cultural 
displacement proposed by modernization theories. 
Describing cultural adaptation, Osei-Kwame says that " .. .integration in Africa's 
ethnically pluralistic states is a learning process in which individual tribesmen cultivate a 
habit of accepting, tolerating and cooperating with other individuals from different ethnic 
groups while not repudiating their own ethnic groups. "12 The assumption that ethnic 
12 Osei-Kwame, A New Conceptual Model for the Study of Political Integration in Africa, 57. 
11 
integration can occur among separate group identities is the basis of the cultural 
adaptation model. 
This model has both a horizontal and vertical integration dimension. Horizontal 
integration assumes cohesion within each group so that as a unit it engages in 
rapprochement with other groups. Such rapprochement assumes that each group is 
"rational politically because it can assess the costs and benefits accruing to them from 
their association with others." 13 Horizontal integration also assumes that the groups 
know each other well enough through education, urbanization or commerce so that this 
knowledge has a positive effect on attitudes concerning inter-ethnic association. 
Using the concept of horizontal integration, Fein identified four different types of 
societies representing various levels of ethnic group interaction. He identified the society 
with a high level of internal cohesion and inter-ethnic group interaction to be the one that 
is integrated. Other combinations of group cohesion and inter-group interaction are the 
transitory society, the caste society and the detribalized society, depending on the level of 
internal cohesion and level of interaction with other groups. For example, in a caste, 
group members have little interaction outside their own, but they are highly cohesive 
within the caste.14 
13 Ibid., p.58. 
14 "A Typology of Horizontal Integration," adapted from Leonard, J Fein., The Ecology of The Public 
Schools: An Inquiry Into Community Control (New York: Pegasus, 1971), 46, quoted in Osei-Kwame, A 
Conceptual Model/or The Study of Political Integration in Africa, 60. 
12 
The most interesting society from a policy perspective is the detribalized society. 
It represents a low intra-group cohesion but a high inter-group interaction. It represents 
an ideal nationally integrated society. The cultural displacement model discussed in the 
last section aims for this kind of society as well. The post-independence policies on 
nation building assumed such a perspective, but such policies did not succeed because the 
infrastructure for horizontal integration is undeveloped in Africa. 
If the groups are to integrate horizontally, the majority of the members must 
encounter each other at some arena such as commerce and a high level of urbanization. 
These conditions require a high level of development. If we are to go by this observation, 
it can be concluded that previous policies on national integration, that assumed to achieve 
this position, were impractical. African society is characterize_d by high intra-group 
cohesion and therefore integration would represent interaction between self contained 
groups. Strategies of integration must recognize and utilize this fact. 
The second component of the cultural adaptation model is vertical integration that 
describes the level of support for modem institutions. That arena is the state and its 
institutions, which all groups must feel is relevant to them. All groups must feel that the 
institution of parliament represents their interests. For example, the problem of how 
minorities should be represented has not been satisfactorily dealt with, causing political 
instability, civil wars and calls for secession. The problem for Africa is that the majority 
of the people are in tribal communities, and interact with the state only through their 
ethnic elite. This factor is mainly responsible for the development of patron client 
relationships which causes corruption and difficulties in the application of the rule of law. 
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The low level of development of the people is directly responsible for the weaknesses of 
the institutions in Africa. Since they do not force the politicians to be accountable, their 
support for modern institutions is therefore very weak. In short, the adaptation theory of 
ethnic integration reveals critical factors that need to be taken into consideration when 
crafting strategies for national integration. First, for horizontal integration to take place, 
it has been revealed that interaction with other ethnic groups is essential, but the elite 
have a monopoly on such interaction. Second, for vertical integration to take place, a 
high support for modern institutions is essential, and here again the elite have more 
access to these institutions. 
5. Cultural Displacement or Cultural Adaptation? 
Given the two theories of national integration described in the last two sections, 
critical issues facing African policy makers arise. The cultural displacement model, on 
one hand, shows that-post colonial governments wanted to achieve integration while 
assuming de-tribalized societies when these societies were on the whole still tribal. The 
intra-cultural cohesion· provided by ethnicity could not be broken by centralization of 
state power or continuous appeals for national unity. The cultural adaptation model, on 
the other hand, shows that integration can be achieved by the ethnic groups from their 
tribal positions. The ethnic groups need to interact across tribal lines so that they know 
each other, and also vertically through a high support for modem institutions. Both 
cultural adaptation and cultural displacement can be achieved through mass education, 
urbanization, trade, growth of civil societies and other forms of social mobilization. 
Whether the appropriate model to be used is cultural displacement or cultural adaptation, 
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the above discussion points to a critical factor for national integration, and that factor is 
social modernization. 
How is the theory of the origin of nations useful for this study? It is useful in that 
if the "myth symbol complexes" which bind individuals into a community are durable, the 
strategies of nation builders should be include accepting that a nation can be built around 
existing ethnic communities. One of those strategies may be to align communities which 
inhabit the same territory with new "myths and symbol complexes," such as the historical 
struggles against a common enemy such as colonialism, or the struggle for economic and 
social deve~opment to bind together members of different communities. Nation building 
becomes an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process. Ethnicity is regarded as an 
asset for nation building because all groups are regarded as essential to the country and 
not as a problem. An ethnic group that is considered an obstacle in the nation building 
process may not contribute positively to that process. For example if the Tutsi are 
considered to be a problem or a liability in the Congo, then the process of nation building 
in that country can not proceed smoothly. How does the theory of the ethnic origin of 
nations relate to the post colonial African context? The colonial governments that were 
headed by the appointed governor were centralized administrative structures that 
collected taxes and maintained law and order. Accountability to the people by this 
administrative structure was very weak. The post-colonial state inherited this apparatus 
together with its weak culture of accountability. The culture of weak national 
consciousness and accountability among the elite led them to utilize ethnic bases for 
championing political agendas. While otiicial policies in post colonial Africa considered 
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ethnicity to be a liability to nation building, the same officials used ethnicity when it 
suited them. The failure to recognize the utility of ethnicity as a basis for nation building 
seems to have backfired because post-colonial Africa has been characterized by ethnically 
motivated tensions and violence. 
The theory of the ethnic origin of nations suggests that nation building can occur 
through a slow process of national integration. A solution that allows for the reduction of 
tensions so that the diffusion of "myth-symbol complexes" can take place. At Africa's 
current level of modernization, national integration which is part of nation building must 
proceed from the acceptance of ethnic communities and not from ignoring them. 
Relating nation building to the reduction of tensions, James Coleman and Carl 
Rosenberg say that national integration takes place at the territorial and at the political 
level. Territorially, national ii:itegration involves the "progressive reduction of cultural 
and regional tensions and discontinuities in the process of creating a homogenous 
territorial political community." 15 At the territorial level then, it is not necessary that 
there be one culture, only that tension between cultures are reduced. 
Politically, national integration refers to the bridging of the "elite-mass gap," in 
order to bring more people to participate in the political process, and establish 
accountability of the elite to the population. The inability of the masses to control the 
15 James Coleman and Carl Rosenberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Africa (Berkeley 
University of California Press, 1964 ), p.9, quoted in Claude Ake, A T7uory of Political Integration 
(Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1967), 13. 
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political behavior of the elite is called the "elite-mass gap."16 The elite-mass gap arises 
because the masses, still composed largely of peasants, do not fully comprehend the 
concept of the nation state. The elite-mass gap affects national integration in two ways. 
First, since the masses are passive, political competition occurs only between the ethnic 
elite, with the masses relying on the patronage of their respective ethnic elite to relate to 
the state. The reason for the existence of the elite-mass gap is the lack of sophistication 
by the masses, which allows the political elite to ignore institutional controls. The elite-
mass gap therefore arises because of underdevelopment in society. Second, the elite who 
emerged from the masses, bring to the bureaucracy a parochialism which weakens the 
development of a tradition of bureaucratic impartiality, a factor which exacerbates 
existing tensions. 
6. State Society Refations 
Weak national integration in African states is basically caused by under -
development which is manifested in low horizontal and vertical integration as described 
in the last section. Secondly, underdevelopment causes weak state-society relations, a 
factor that weakens the state. 
How does such a weak state arise? It arises because the masses are ignorant 
concerning their "rights" in the state's decision process. The elite acts as the political 
patrons of the masses and since horizontal integration is weak, each ethnic group is 
16 The concept of the "elite-mass gap" was developed by Edward Shils, Political Development in the New 
Nations: Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 11 ( 1960) 3: 265-92, cited in Claude Ake, A 
Theory of Political Integration, 68-81. 
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represented at the state level by its own elite. This way, political competition between 
elites becomes ethnic competition. Most important, national resources are controlled by 
the state because private capital accumulation is very low. Competition for control of the 
state is very stiff, and the system leaves losers very bitter to the extent that they mobilize 
their ethnic bases against the state. On the other hand the winners are very insecure, 
suspicious of any desire for local liberties and therefore quickly resort to repression. 
It is evident that policies such as the one-party states and the abolition of local 
leadership have backfired. In 1966, Milton Obote of Uganda quarreled with the chief of 
the Buganda local administration. He attacked the chiefs palace using the army, and the 
chief escaped to exile. After this Obote suspended the constitution and declared himself 
president of a one-party state. Obote was latter ousted by the army which had helped him 
establish the one-party state. This phenomenon was repeated in other parts of Africa, for 
example in the kingdom of Lesotho where premier Leboa Jonathan also exiled the king. 
In Zambia there was an uneasy relationship between the Barotse paramount chief and 
Kenneth Kaunda. 
Many of these nationalist leaders, given their background described earlier, did 
not necessarily come from the dominant ethnic groups. Their behavior towards the local 
leadership of such groups reveals their attitude to ethnic integration. They regarded 
traditional leadership as a threat to national unity. With regard to national integration, 
they regarded ethnic cohesion as a liability, which went beyond the mere feeling of a 
threat to personal power. For example, during the constitutional crisis which led to the 
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quarrel with the Buganda traditional leadership, Milton Obote said that his government 
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••• will never be dislodged from power by any mathematical manipulations, 11 referring to 
the Buganda ethnic group's numerical superiority. In the following year he changed the 
constitution so that the Buganda ethnic group would be neutralized. 
Some writers, such as Kofi Busia, oppose the kind of centralization that occurred 
in Uganda and other countries and they call for unity in diversity.17 They think that 
multi-ethnicity is compatible with national integration and by implication, disagree with 
state efforts to downplay ethnic expression through institutional mechanisms such as the 
one party state. If different tribes feel that the state meets their needs, they will not have 
difficulty being loyal to the nation from their tribal positions. 
According to this argument, the main challenge is for the African state to fin~ a 
new sense of legitimacy so that the different ethnic groups can be loyal to the new nation 
on that basis. The state has so far relied on the boundaries set in Berlin in 1884 for its 
raison d'etre, but unfortunately these have not been universally accepted. 
The unifying principles advanced by the liberating fathers ( e.g., like Kwame 
Nkrumah's African socialism, Kenyatta's harambe, Nyerere's pan-Africanism, or 
Kaunda's one Zambia-one nation) have not provided effective political socialization for 
integration despite the high stress that each of these leaders placed on these policies. 
These leaders officially downplayed ethnicity, or acted as if there was some inherent spirit 
of African oneness that required arousing. Since such a· spirit does not exist, such 
17 Kofi A Busia, Africa in Search of Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1967),117, quoted in Osei-Kwame, 
A New Conceptual Model for the Study of Political Integration in Africa, 19-20. 
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policies on national integration were not consistent, and as a result they sometimes caused 
more division. 
The point is that the failure of the policies of national integration followed by 
African leaders is not because of the policies per se, but rather the socio-economic 
environment in which those policies are applied. The elite would not succeed to divide 
the people if there was adequate horizontal integration among them. Patronage would not 
corrupt the leaders in the way it did if people demanded institutions which ensured 
accountability. Lack of both vertical and horizontal integration makes national 
integration at lower levels of development very difficult. Horizontal and vertical 
integration are increased by modernization, making modernization to be such an 
important factor in national integration. 
The search for integration strategies continues. Since social modernization is a 
critical factor in national integration, the military is often thought to be a modernizing 
institution. In this study, the military will be evaluated through comparison to see 
~hether the military can be an instrument of national integration. 
C. THE MILITARY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION 
Can the military be an instrument for national integration? If the military is to 
succeed as such an instrument, its members must change their behavior, and then transmit 
this new behavior to society. An analysis based on behavior poses a clear challenge to 
establishing clear behavior standards and patterns which would be attributed to the 
influence of the military institution on society. The internal dynamics of the military and 
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how it influences key areas of societal integration enables those outcomes of internal 
dynamics to influence society in the direction of integration. 
How do these state or societal demands impact on the military's internal dynamics 
to produce desired outcomes? As will be explained below, politicians often give the 
military the task of demonstrating the unity of the nation through its recruitment and 
promotion policies. In an ethnically divided country such a demand on the military may 
be interpreted in the context of the ongoing ethnic rivalry. Does the military interpret 
demands to integrate as legitimate demands in relation to what it perceives as its raison 
d'etre? Dietz, Elkin and Romani, state that the military wants to relate the demand to 
integrate to its ability to succeed in the tasks of national security, and not view it as 
merely an arbitrary requirement handed down by politicians with no professional military 
relevance.18 
1. The Theory of the School of the Nation 
One theory advanced in the 1960s viewed the military as an ideal instrument of 
development in the developing world. According to this "school of the nation theory" the 
military would act like a training institution for patriotic and national values. The 
argument was that experience in service to the whole nation with a multiethnic cadre, 
plus the theoretical knowledge and practical skills obtained in the military would 
18 Henry Dietz, Jerrold Elkin, Maurice Rommani, Ethnicity, Integration and the Military (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, No. 3, 1991), 7-8. 
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transform servicemen attitudinally and develop a models for citizenship in general.19 
Morris Janowitz describes this modernizing theory when he says that the military may 
serve as an agent of social change, by developing in its members a sense of national 
identity. 
The internal dynamics of the military was therefore thought to be naturally 
homogenizing, and this military quality could be transmitted to the r.est of society.20 A 
nation which suffered colonialism and wants to incorporate diverse ethnic and tribal 
groups may use the military to impart the "social psychological" element of national 
unity. Military training and culture emphasizes corporate group identity, through the 
monopolized function of serving as the nation's instrument of violence. This is a unique 
national task that aligns the soldier to the nation rather than to an ethnic group. In the 
military there is a higher opportunity for equal treatment, and the result is a higher sense 
of cohesion and social solidarity because men and women of various regional and ethnic 
backgrounds are given a common experience and come to think of themselves in national 
terms. 
J anowitz identifies two different aspects concerning the military as an "agency for 
building a sense of national identity." One aspect is the service role just described. The 
other aspect of military influence involves the symbolic value of the armed forces for the 
population. Unfortunately most militaries of sub-Saharan Africa are too small to have a 
19 Morris Janowitz, The Military in The Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press,1964), 82-84. 
20 Ibid., p.84. 
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major impact on their nations. However in countries such as Nigeria and South Africa 
where civil wars were experienced, there was sufficient mobilization for the military to 
penetrate the social fabric of the nation. The military is a symbol of the nation. This is 
why it participates in displays at national ceremonies. Militaries are also called to 
alleviate hardships in communities befallen by natural disasters, and they are often the 
main element in the civil defense programs of nations. The "school of the nation" theory 
of the military agrees with the detribalizing or modernization theory of integration 
because the military acts as a school where a serviceman comes out after the military 
service as more national tban a tribal man. According to this theory, depending on the 
size and demands of a particular military, the military can contribute to national 
integration. 
Crucially, if the military is to modernize society, it must itself be more modem 
than the society. The problem that arises is how the military can achieve the task of 
detribalizing society when it resides within that society. The school of the nation theory 
had the same weakness as the cultural displacement model described earlier, and would 
not work in a society with a low level of development. The school of the nation theory 
was therefore the wrong model for the level of development. That problem led to the 
recognition of the existence of "ethnic security maps" which affect the military's role in 
national integration. "Ethnic-security maps" refers to the cortceptualization by the 
political elite that a particular ethnic composition of the military would give maximum 
security to the state. The ethnic elite that does not control the state has its own security 
map, and it restructures the military when ever it gets a chance to control the state. The 
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security mapping is therefore an elite-security mapping because it is the political elite 
who demonstrate this behavior. 
2. The Concept of "Ethnic-security Maps" 
The behavior of the military, where it had seized power, was observed to be no 
different from that of the civilians they replaced in power. This factor contributed to the 
refutation of the "school of the nation theory." 
A specific refutation of this theory emanates from a study by Cynthia Enloe on the 
military and ethnicity. The basic argument in this theory is that ethnicity is dynamic and 
it therefore finds its way into the military. The issue arises from the raison d'etre of the 
military which is the "abstract notion of national security." Since the military is 
controlled directly by the state, as distinct from the nation, the security of the nation and 
that of the state will be secured if their interests coincide. The problem is that the 
dynamism of ethnicity causes ethnicity to move into the state and through the state into 
the military. If the state control is skewed ethnically, control of the military will be 
ethnically skewed to ensure more of the security of the dominant ethnic group rather than 
the security of the nation. Enloe observes that the military will be unsuccessful as a 
national integrator because the interests of ethnic elite find their way into the military. 
The military is forced to pursue security interests according to the "ethnic-security 
maps."21 Ethnic-security maps refer to the perception of the political elite about the 
ethnic composition of the military that the elite regards as safe. 
21 Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1980), 1-22. 
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All those programs suggested above to strengthen the internal integrative forces 
that could be transmitted to society are pursued within the military in the context of elite's 
security maps. In the event of a military coup, where the state and the military are one, 
the failure of the military to act as an instrument of national integration becomes acute as 
the military imposes the "ethnic-security map" directly. Ethnic security maps exist 
because ethnic cohesion is strong, and this suggests that for the military to succeed as an 
instrument of integration it must be working within a strategy which recognizes this fact. 
In developing the theory of integration earlier, it was found that the cultural adaptation 
model meets this quality. 
The theoretical approach put forward by Enloe rests on the existence of security 
maps. However, what arguments are advanced for the existence of ethnic security maps? 
There is evidence that these ethnic security maps enter the internal military dynamics and 
under given circumstances they may spill over to society as a whole. In support of the 
existence of ethnic-security maps, Horowitz says that the "military is both a resource and 
'!-Il object of ethnic conflict." He further states that the military reflects the divisions in 
society, and if ethnic composition of the military does not mirror the ethnic composition 
of society, the divisions in the military become politically significant. 22 It becomes 
politically significant because the government then seeks to correct this lack of 
congruence by interfering with appointments and promotions in the military. In 
correcting the situation, the politicians sometimes breach the core values of the military. 
22 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 443. 
25 
These values include the maintenance of seniority in promotions and the following of the 
administrative chain of command. Political interference in military affairs then 
constitutes the first major breach of civil-military boundaries.23 
In many newly independent African countries such as Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria, 
and Sierra Leone, the military reacted to this kind of interference with military coups, 
which reflected a breakdown of these civilian-military boundaries. Following Horowitz's 
"breach of boundaries" theory, the implication is that there is a certain type of political 
military relationship which is based on non-interference in each other's territory of values. 
It can be said by inference that in order for the military to act as instrument of political 
integration, it must have corporate values which it passes over to society. Moreover, 
these values must mature within the military's institutional boundaries. However, this 
maturity will not occur if the political elite breach these boundaries to destroy the value 
basis of military professionalism such as, for example, the military's highly developed 
bureaucratic impartiality that was mentioned earlier. It is this military professionalism 
which society can copy to effect political integrati~n among its members. 
Horowitz's breach of boundaries theory refutes that of the school of the nation, but 
not that of Enloe's "ethnic-security maps." Horowitz shows us by the four African 
examples mentioned above that the military is a viable entity with independent values, 
which it sometimes protects strongly when those values are attack~d. It may also show us 
that if the central military values are not destroyed from outside, the military may serve as 
23 Ibid. p. 469. 
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a "school of the nation." Horowitz does not provide a theory of societal integration, but 
shows the consequences to integration when the "ethnic security maps" circumstances 
exist. 
According to Dietz et al., the theory reveals three factors that interact with each 
other to decide on the ability of the military to be an instrument of social integration. 
These factors are the military itself, the state, and the ethnic make-up of the society. 
According to the theory set out above, integration "can be represented by the binary 
interrelations of all three as well as by the fusion of all three simultaneously."24 The 
state, military and ethnic composition factors should also be viewed in relation to the 
level of modernization of the society in which they operate. Society's modernization 
refers to its socio-economic development as shown by indicators such as size of the 
private sector, a diversified economy and sophistication of the citizenry. The more 
modernized the society is, the more likely the interactions of the three will enable the 
military to be an instrument of social integration. Analogous to this is the interaction of 
~e air, moisture and a seed that generally produces plant life (social integration), but it is 
the availability of nutrients that produce quality growth and eventual fruit. In any society, 
the military will interact with the state and ethnic groups as explained above. Modernity 
of society is therefore a factor in contributing to the ability of the military to act as an 
instrument of political integration. 
24 Dietz, et al., p.14. 
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Raising the level of society's development makes it more sophisticated, therefore 
reducing the gap between the elite and the masses. A sophisticated society forces the elite 
to contribute qualitatively to the process of national integration. That will happen if there 
is not a big gap of sophistication between the elite and the masses. The "elite-mass gap" 
therefore presents a fundamental challenge to the political environment and civil-military 
relations in most parts of Africa. Whether any particular military can be an instrument of 
national integration will be answered by the interaction of the military with the elite, the 
state, and the society at the level of modernity depicted by each of these variables. The 
next section will examine how the factors discussed in the theory affected the 
performance of the military concerning national integration, and the civil-military 
relations that emanated from the interaction of those factors. 
3. Effect of Level of Development 
From the theory of national integration and those of the military as an instrument 
of national integration discussed in the previous sections, it has been established that the 
level of development is the fundamental variable that can make or break an integration 
strategy. First, considering modernization models of ethnic integration, they do not work 
in African societies because they are still too unsophisticated for modernization strategies 
to work. The main example was the use of state functionaries, such as the political party, 
as a broker between the ethnic groups. Many political parties broke into factionalism 
soon after independence. Those that did not break up were incapacitated by ethnic 
squabbles. Instability caused by these ethnic squabbles resulted in either military coups 
or dictatorships. State functionaries suffer from poor vertical linkages since the masses 
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can not control the political class. A political party or the military, which are modern 
institutions will not function as integrators if there is suspicion and tension. For the 
military it may even cause a civil war and the demise of the country as a political entity. 
Enloe argued that the political class impose their security maps on the military and 
therefore transfer the tensions of elite political competition into the military. If being 
ethnically divided is a bad thing, why do social forces not stop the political class from 
sowing seeds of division? This study argues that the behavior of the political class is only 
a symptom of the problems caused by the low level of underdevelopment. Development 
makes the masses to become sophisticated enough to demand more accountability from 
the political class. Consequently that class responds by establishing institutions to ensure 
this accountability. 
Second, the model of cultural adaptation borrows from two opposed 
concepts. One concept is cultural displacement, a concept that allows for the use of state 
institutions such as a political party or the military as strategies for national integration as 
d.escribed in the last paragraph. It was found that these strategies do not work at a low 
level of development. The other concept is one based on the theory that the origin of 
nations is primordial and therefore the historical myths and symbols that hold each ethnic 
group change more slowly. Since nations have a primordial origin, the cultural 
adaptation model Uierefore allows integration to occur more slowly, allowing the 
horizontal linkages between the ethnic groups to evolve. Horizontal linkages develop 
through a process of modernization. 
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Theory has shown that if integration is approached only through state intervention, 
modernization of society is important for success. Also, if the state takes the primordial 
theory into consideration and adopts an adaptive mode in its strategies, it will still face 
the problems of development. This study will demonstrate through comparison that in 
Nigeria, where the level of socio economic development is low, such institutions could 
not succeed, because "ethnic security maps" easily entered the military. Consequently, 
the military failed to be an instrument of integration, even if at some point during the 
period under study it was playing a central role in the government. In South Africa, 
where the level of development is high, there were vertical and horizontal linkages 
because of industrialization and urbanization. Ethnic-security maps do not function in 
such an environment. As such the military is successful as an instrument of national 
integration. This study will assess how the level of development of the political elite, the 
state and society impact on the ability of the military to be an instrument of integration. 
D. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
Nation building is crucially important for the developing countries of Africa. It is 
part of the development process, an issue whose path is being debated throughout the 
continent. This research will contribute both to the debate on development matters and 
more specifically to the military's role in that process. The military is important for 
stability, a factor that is vital for the modernization process. If the military becomes an 
instrument of the national policy of ethnic integration, this has implications for 
recruitment, advancement of its members, deployment and command of forces to 
30 
demonstrate this ethnic visibility. Such a policy has implications for defense resources 
management and also affects operational doctrine. This topic is therefore important 
because the above-mentioned factors affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
military. 
Since the military is an instrument of the state, this study will reveal the state 
structures in a multi-ethnic African country. It is in the context of the specific state 
structures that the civil-military relations in a country can be crafted. This study seeks to 
contribute to the subject of civil-military relations in a post-colonial African context. The 
study can be used by politicians who may want to use the theory of national integration to 
design their defense policies and by those who think about nation building issues. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
The study will compare the activities of national integration by the military in the 
first six years of independence in Nigeria and the South African transition from apartheid 
and to majority rule. It will be demonstrated that the military's role in national integration 
results from an interaction of the political elite, the state and the society variables, at the 
relevant level of socio-economic development. The thesis should reveal why the 
Nigerian military was split by social forces, while the South African military was not. 
Within the period under study, the political elite, the state and the society in each 
case· did not change significantly. Since the level of socio-economic development of the 
variables is different in each case, this leads one to suspect that it is this modernity factor 
which caused the different out comes. It will be shown that in both societies the political 
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elite wanted the military to protect their ethnic interests, but in the Nigerian case, they 
were unconstrained by the rule of law, causing the military to fail. In the South African 
case, the developed state institutions were constraining factors on the elite, as such the 
military was successful within the six year period. The next section explains the 
interaction of the military with the .political elite, the military with the state and the 
military with the society. 
1. Military and Society 
The task will be to investigate the military interaction with society in each case, 
and to formulate an opinion about the effect of social forces on the cohesiveness in the 
military. The premise of such an investigation is that soldiers are members of society and 
as such they will react to social iss_ues of economic, ethnic and general· matters of 
governance. Their reaction to these issues depends to a large extent on how they sustain 
organizational legitimacy. That legitimacy may determine how they function as an 
integrating or modernizing force. 
2. Military and Political Elite 
The crucial issue is the nature of the "ethnic security maps" held by the 
civilian and military elites. Enloe says that state elites have in their minds clear 
expectations about the dependability of each ethnic group concerning state security and 
the current state structure. To maximi~e state security, " .. .it is important to state elites 
that they should create and maintain a pattern of ethnic relations and state-ethnic relations 
32 
that will maximize state security. "25 Each group is therefore treated according to its 
reliability in view of the elite-security mapping. The study should find out whether the 
military elite also perceives these state-security maps, and how far they operationalize 
them. If the military operationalizes ethnic-security maps to the disadvantage of their 
own cohesion this shows a weakness on their part. The strength of the military as an. 
institution is crucial here. Can it withstand political pressures to defend its internal 
cohesion. The political process there fore needs to be looked at with respect to the 
political role of the military and the effect of ethnic divisions on civil-military relations. 
3. Military and State 
Three political and military relationships that influence the state security mapping 
can be identified. In one system the military officers· are members of the ruling party and 
therefore participate in political decisions that affect the behavior of the military to social 
integration. Another type is patronage based linkages, where a patron -client relationship 
is developed between politicians .and military officers. When a country is ethnically 
divided and clientalist linkages are established with politicians, this may cause cleavages 
in the military. Civilian control of the military may be enhanced, but in the long run it 
may undermine the integrity of the military, producing resentment on the part of military 
officers from disfavored ethnic groups. The third relationship is that of political 
neutrality. Political neutrality means that the military takes orders from the government 
of the day even though the political implications of those orders may not be pleasant to 
25 Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers, 15. 
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the military elite. The corollary to this point is that if the government requires the 
military to implement a policy that it views to be emanating from an "ethnic-security 
mapping," the only factor which may stand between the military and its implementation is 
the lawfulness of the order. This thesis will analyze how each of the above three modes 
of state military interaction operated in each case and to what effect. 
4. Level of Social Modernization 
Why does ethnic engagement in the military become successful and 
positively affect the integration of society to some extent, such as in the South African or 
American military, and yet fail and cause more polarization as in Nigeria? The level of 
society's modernization, may be crucial in the interactions of the elite, state and society 
described in the above ·sections. Aspects of modernization such as the size and 
diversification of the economy, the development of social institutions, urbanization or 
level of literacy should affect the military as both a creator and a receiver of social values 
from its social environment. Scholars observed that in developing countries, the military 
was more modem than society. Expressing this view, Janowitz argued that, " .. .in general 
armies and their ambitious officer cadres are the focal points for overcoming barriers to 
modernization inherent in traditional value bases such as religion, and the varied ethnic 
value systems of sub-Sahara Africa."26 Enloe, on the other hand, says that the "saliency 
of ethnicity in the state military" has not been decreasing for the last 150 years, as would 
be supposed by modernization theory. She further argues that although modernization is 
26 Janowitz, The Military in the Development of New Nations, 44. 
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increasing, it does not necessarily carry along an inevitable decline in ethnicity's 
relevance for military affairs.27 This thesis is not about whether ethnicity persists with 
development, but it is about why some militaries despite being multi-ethnic impact 
positively to national integration while others do not. This debate shows that the level of 
modernization is a relevant variable to consider in assessing the ability of the military to 
be an instrument of national integration. 
The dependent variable in this study is the potential for national integration. The 
independent variables, i.e., the elite, the state and the society are high for South Africa 
and they are low for Nigerie;i. Their effect on the potential for national integration will be 
assessed follows: 
• The ability of the political elite to increase the potential for national integration will 
be measured by the level of ethnic cross-voting. The higher the level of cross-voting, 
¢.e better the political elite positively affects national integration. A developed 
political elite will be less parochial and will therefore have horizontal linkages 
through commerce and industry that translate into political linkages. 
• A case where politicians break the rules of bureaucratic impartiality, by unlawfully 
practicing ethnic favoritism, and get away with it, contributes negatively to national 
integration. The quality of a developed state may be measured by the strength of its 
institutions. Institutional weakness causes mistrust and tensions between different 
ethnic groups and negatively affects national integration. The ability of the state to 
27 Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers, 212. 
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increase the potential for national integration will be taken to depend on the 
effectiveness of the state institutions to restrict politicians from breaking the law. 
• The size of peasant population relative to urban wage earners, the literacy rate and the 
relative per capita income will be used to show the level of development of society in 
each case. If the population is peasant, poor and illiterate, it will fail to stop the 
politicians from manipulating the population through client-patronage networks. 
That weakens national integration by undermining the development of horizontal 
linkages. 
5. Case Selection 
Case selection is always problematic in comparative analysis. Since the results of 
the study concern the military as an instrument of national integration, the militaries 
chosen for study, must be based on similar doctrines, preferably western military 
traditions, which include that it must be apolitical. We can then investigate why there 
were different outcomes on militaries with similar orientations about politics. The 
political process must be subjected to influence by the ethnic elite who may or may not 
directly control the military. There must be sizable social categories that compete for 
economic and political supremacy. The two cases have been selected because of the 
similarity of the characteristics described above that were taking place during equivalent 
periods. The level of modernization will be applied to the variables identified in each 
case. 
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The study will utilize secondary data that deals with the military and ethnic 
integration in the two cases. Using the theoretical literature on ethnicity, civil-military 
relations and national integration, Chapter I suggested an answer to the question why the 
military fails or succeeds to be an instrument of national integration. The suggested 
answer was the differences in the level of socio- economic development. Chapters II and 
ill will evaluate the hypotheses against the empirical data from Nigeria (1960-1966) and 
South Africa (1992-1998). Both ·cases are sub-Saharan countries with a history of ethnic 
division and conflict. They differ mainly with respect to the level of development. 
Nigeria has a low level of development, while South Africa has a high level. Chapter IV 
will provide a comparative analysis, conclusions and recommendations. 
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II. THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL 
INTEGRATION (1960-1966) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nigeria has 248 distinct languages, but two-thirds of them are united in three main 
groups. The other one third comprises minorities who for administrative purposes, the 
government considers them to be affiliated with each of the three main groups. The main 
three groups are the Hausa-Fulani of the Northern Region, the Yoruba in the South West, 
and the Ibo of the South East. Another important north-south divide is religion; because 
the north is predominantly Moslem while in the south there is a mixture of traditionalists, 
Christians and a few Moslems. Nigeria as a state is a colonial creation and it can be 
argued that colonial legacy concretized the ethnic cleavages between these three ethnic 
groups, because the British dec~ared separate protectorates for each region in 1900. In the 
Northern Region a policy called indirect rule was established. The traditional rulers, 
emirs, were in charge of all administration with the colonial power being the general 
overseer. 
In the southern regions the British ruled directly, encouraging education. The 
consequences of the education gap were far reaching, because when Nigerianization of 
the civil service began in 1948, the south dominated the civil service including the police 
and the officer ranks of the armed forces. Also of significance is the notable advance of 
the Ibo southerners, where education and Christianity had spread somewhat liberally. 
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They dominated the civil service and the bureaucracy to the extent that at independence 
most of the military officers were lbos. 
Very significant was the development of the colonial economy. Private 
indigenous enterprise was discouraged and replaced by statutory monopolies in 
agriculture, mining, transportation, communication or marketing. This means that after 
independence, the main sector of employment became the state. Control of the state as an 
access avenue to personal growth was the goal of political competition. In each of the 
three regions of Nigeria, there developed dominant classes who inherited the colonial 
structure and adopted its forms of administration. 
This chapter will seek to prove that Nigeria's level of development was low. The 
political elite and the state were not developed enough to meet the challenges of national 
integration. The society was poor and largely illiterate, characteristics of a low level of 
development. The low level of development of these variables also affected the military 
to the extent that it could not act as an instrument of national integration. Each variable 
will be tested using the measures established in the methodology section above. 
B. THE EFFECT OF THE ELITE 
This section will assess the characteristics and the sources of the behavior of the 
Nigerian political elite and relate that behavior to its influence on the military. It will be 
shown that the political class was still in the process of formation, and did not have the 
modem characteristics. Its base was still the primordial social foundation of peasantry 
and tradition. 
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Northern Nigeria had existed before colonialism as a feudal state ruled by chiefs 
or emirs. Colonialism did not dismantle the feudal structure, but actually strengthened it 
through a system called indirect rule. The emirs were elevated by the system of indirect 
rule into local administrators who collected taxes and maintained law and order on behalf 
of the colonial administrator. This aristocracy shunned western education, allowing 
education to reach a few of its members, but preventing it from reaching the lower 
classes. 
When transition to self-rule began in 1951, the political class in the north 
comprised the aristocrats, the few educated officials in the administration of emirates, and 
the wealthy merchants. This political class was consolidated around the Northern Peoples 
Congress (NPC), a political party which was forme~ to dominate the politics of the 
northern region. The NPC became the vehicle for control of the federation as well. This 
was a sure way of protecting the northern establishment from being infiltrated by southern 
egalitarian ideas. The aristocrats were of the Fulani ethnic group, while the Hausa ethnic 
groups were mainly of merchant class, who financed the administration. The lower 
classes were kept in their place by a system of repression, and during elections their votes 
were ensured through a process of intimidation and where applicable by promises of the 
provision of amenities. The merchants were bought off by protecting their activities and 
incorporating them into the higher ranks of the NPC. 
The political class of the south was formulated around traditional rulers, as in the 
north, but traditional rule in the south did not have the class stratification found in the 
northern feudal structure. The political class came from the rising commercial and 
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professional elite who controlled the ruling political parties. The public sector dominated 
the economy and therefore served as an instrument of class formation and 
consolidation.28 A position in public office was an instrument of personal wealth. 
Since to holding a poitical office requires the winning of elections, the strategy 
that the political elite utilized to win elections was the manipulation of ethnic pride and 
prejudices. This strategy was successful because most of the society was illiterate and 
individual interests were subordinated to the patronage passed to their communities by 
the political elite. The masses were cut off from any influence they could exert on the 
state, a situation that reflects a high elite- mass gap. In the absence of any horizontal 
integration, the economic and political power was in the hands of the elite. To measure 
the level of elite development, regional cross-voting was used.29 The argument is that if 
the elites are socially and politically developed, they will be able campaign and obtain 
votes from across the ethnic spectrum. Table 1 shows the percentage of votes obtained by 
each of the three main parties in each region. The 1959 elections produced solid block 
voting based on regional lines. 
28 Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria, 37. 
29 Data obtained from Richard Sklar. Nigerian Political Panies: Power in an Emergent African Nation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 35-37. 
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REGION North Lagos West East Variance 
NPC .61 .002 .01 .12 .07 
NCNC .16 .55 .4 .65 .03 
AG .17 .43 .49 .23 .02 
Table 1: Level of Cross-ethnic Voting for Nigerian General Election (1959) 
The winning party, the NPC had a big majority in the north, but lost heavily in the 
other regions. The large variance for the NPC means that although it won the elections, 
its leadership was accepted in only one region. The NCNC won most seats in the east, 
and also in Lagos. Lagos was declared a region for electoral purposes, because it was the 
federal capital, and had attracted many eastern and Mid-Western ethnic groups. That vote 
in Lagos does not reflect cross- ethnic voting, but reflects the ethnic ratios of the Yoruba 
and the alliances around the Ibo communities in the city. The Action Group Party (AG) 
of Western Nigeria won in the west. Each party only won in its region, a factor that 
shows that cross-ethnic voting was very low. This demonstrated a weak horizontal 
integration, in tum indicating a low level of elite development, because the elite could not 
sell their ideas outside the parochial confines of ethnic interests. The variances tell us the 
level of national acceptability, a high variance like that of the NPC, tells us that the party's 
acceptability is very low in most regio~s, but very high in one region. Since the 1959 
general elections produced the dominance of three political parties (each in its respective 
region), a coalition was therefore necessary for national unity. Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa, NPC Vice President, became the Prime Minister after making an alliance with 
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the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), a southern party which was 
controlled from Eastern Nigeria. The AG became the opposition. 
Each of these political parties also controlled the regional governments, where the 
federal system allowed them to have substantive economic resources at their disposal. 
These included public services such as marketing boards and development corporations. 
More power over the national economy was relegated to the center. In a country where 
the bulk of economic resources are in· state hands, control of the political center was 
crucial. 
Since the Action Group of the Western Region had to do something to participate 
in central decision-making, its position outside the government was creating an obvious 
disequilibrium in-the process of resource distribution. The Nigerian crisis started after the 
elections in 1959, when the Western Region's leaders became divided on what strategy to 
follow in the face of their region being shut out of the mainstream of decision-making. 
Chief Awolowo the leader of the Action Group decided to infiltrate the North politically, 
in order to exploit diyisions which existed there, in the hope of obtaining a majority 
victory against the NPC. He hoped to exploit sentiments against the feudal structure in 
the north. Other Action Group members led by Chief Akintola opposed this strategy, 
because they said that their resources were being used in a venture in the north that was 
not assured success. There was a split in the AG's ranks, and Chief Akintola's group 
joined the NPC, a move that isolated Chief Awolowo. 
The gains by the NPC from the misfortunes of the Action Group in the Western 
Region destabilized the ruling coalition. The NPC, which was the majority party, could 
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use its new alliance to achieve a majority without its original coalition partner, the 
NCNC. The problem that began in the west destabilized the entire political system since 
the Eastern Region also found itself being marginalized in the same way that the Western 
Region had been earlier. The leader of the ruling NPC, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, a 
strong traditionalist who was the premier of the Northern Region, had become a political 
ally of Chief Akintola. The latter, unlike Awolowo, did not want to interfere with 
Northern authority relationships. Likewise, Ahmadu Bello said that he wanted the 
problems in the Western Region to be left for the leaders of that region to solve.30 The 
policies of the parties towards the divisions in the Western Region became crucial in the 
alliances which formed in. the election of 1964. Since the arrival of Chief Akintola's 
faction to the ruling coalition had created cracks in that coalition, the NCNC, controlled 
by the Eastern Region, now formed an alliance with Chief Awolowo's Action group for 
the 1964 federal elections. Sir Ahmadu Bello preferred an alliance with Chief Akintola's 
party, the rival of Awolowo's party in the west. The 1964 voting pattern indicated results 
similar to those in 1959. By 1965, the alignments and re-alignments described in this 
section had led the country to political chaos. Chief Awolowo was arrested while a state 
of emergency was declared in the Western Region to restore order. The type of political 
alliances which were being formed, show us more clearly that they were not contributing 
to cross ethnic understanding, but for the elite to establish new formula for accessing the 
resources of the state. Sir Ahmadu Bello's views imply that he was contented with each 
30 Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Panies: Power in the Emergence of an African Nation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963), 151. 
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party retaining its ethnic block support. Such a view is obviously not contributive to 
national integration. The Nigerian political elite had failed to establish a stable political 
entity to integrate the ethnic groups in Nigeria. Larry Diamond offers the following 
explanation for this failure: 
In a dependent colonial economy where economic opportunity was 
severely constricted ... where capital was scarce, indigenous 
entrepreneurship small in scale, private enterprise foreign-dominated and 
poverty pervasive and extreme .... the achievement of this new status, and 
the accumulation of the wealth that marked it came to depend to a large 
degree on the political office, connections and political corruption. 31 
The above quotation suggests that the behavior of the political elite was caused by 
the underdeveloped nature of the socio-economic conditions in Nigeria. The same parties 
that suppressed opposition in their regions were represented at the federal level. It means 
that there was no culture of democracy that they brought to the federal level. Effective 
power fell into the hands of the northern elite, who were worse in terms of suppressing 
democracy in their own region. As described earlier, with respect to the crises in the 
yv estem Region, the central government entered the fray as a competitor rather than an 
arbiter. 
The lack of democratic appreciation could be found in all regions, despite a 
traditional democracy that had existed in the villages of the south. Village democracy 
was no longer able to deliver the values that were expected to flow from the new complex 
organization of the state. Independence brought higher forms of political competition for 
31 Diamond, 33. 
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which village democracy was unsuited. Larry Diamond says that a deep commitment to 
democracy by the nationalists such as Balewa, Azikiwe, and Awolowo " ... did not extend 
deeply below the top level of political leadership. "32 
Specifically, the institutional role of a political opposition was not appreciated by 
the political elite. This phenomenon was discussed in the theory chapter where it was 
seen that the early nationalists assumed that ethnicity was displaceable by an inherent 
spirit of national unity. Any opposition was seen to be abnormal or even antisocial, such 
that it deserved to be sanctioned. That may provide an explanation for lack of tolerance 
in the north, although it has been blamed on the feudal system practiced by the emirs. 
The feudal factor can only be part of the explanation however, because this behavior was 
observed in the southern regions too. The theory section also revealed that it was also 
prevalent in the rest of Africa in the 1960s. In many ways nevertheless, the manner in 
which the emirs were able to adapt their system to incorporate commercial institutions, 
social services and various liberal reforms was remarkable.33 
The lack of integration politics in Nigeria cannot be blamed on the leadership of 
the northern elite alone, but on the political elite as a whole. From the voting pattern in 
the general elections of 1959 to 1964, it is clear that the electorate was regional in 
political preference. The political elite encouraged this because it was an easy way of 
32 Ibid., 70. 
33 Richard L. Sklar, "Crises and Transition in the Political History of Independent Nigeria" quoted in Paul, 
Berkett and Crawford Young, eds., Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria ( University of Rochester Press, 
1997), 17. 
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getting votes, but as discussed above, the problem lay in the underdeveloped socio-
economic basis of the country. The divisions found among the political elite also affected 
the military. The degree of ethnic divisions in the country would have required a far 
higher organizational culture in the military to protect itself from such divisive 
conditions. 34 
In 1961, the government introduced quotas for recruitment of military officers. It 
gave 50 percent to the north and 25 percent to each of the other two regions. It then 
lowered the minimum academic standards for entry in order to accommodate northerners, 
because there were few secondary schools in the north. The Sultan of Sokoto, Sir 
Ahmadu Bello, broke civil-military boundaries by visiting educational institutions in the 
north and making speeches to encourage youths to join the army. As a regional premier, 
his responsibility did not extend to the Army, which was constitutionally at the federal 
level. 
In the chapter on theory, it was explained that when the ruling elite are not 
confident that the existing ethnic composition in the army is reliable, they will want to 
change that composition. This is because the political elite construct their own "ethnic-
security maps" with respect to the military's loyalty. The ruling northern elite, as shown 
by the behavior of Sir Ahmadu Bello, was not comfortable with the security provided by 
the existing composition of the officer corps, which had more southerners. The Minister 
of State to the Army explained the policy of quotas to the senate by saying that, 
34 S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press,1962), 
115. 
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We introduced the quota system in the anny thus preventing the possible 
fear that the army would sometime become unreliable. If any part of the 
country is not represented in the army, we may harbor some fear that a 
particular section will begin to feel that it is being dominated. But now the 
country's safety is assured. 35 
The short-term effect of the quota system was to raise fears among the southern 
officers that preferential recruitment would be extended to promotions. Raising such 
fears and suspicions caused tensions in the army and eliminated the prospect of it 
becoming an instrument of integration. 
This policy was viewed in the same manner by southern politicians. All policies 
were viewed from the point of view of ethnic security and well being. Fear and suspicion 
replaced evaluation and evidence, with rumor acting as the catalyst of decision-making. 
l'hese are the characteristics of weak political culture, which according to Finer, creates 
the environment that encourages militaries to make coups against the weak states.36 
C. THE EFFECT OF THE STATE 
At independence, Nigena inherited a British-style parliamentary democracy with 
p~wer distributed among· the legislature, judiciary, and the executive. Universal adult 
suffrage operated in the south, but was restricted to males only in the north. Political and 
35 Quoted in Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military : A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 244. 
36 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 115. 
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civil rights were formally guaranteed in the constitution. Moreover " ... the press was 
wide, free and fearless. "37 
However political activity was marred by undemocratic practices. Party 
supporters tended to be overzealous, with political and economic pressure exerted on 
opponents.38 The constitution set up federal and regional legislatures, giving wide 
powers of local administration to the regional governments. Though it also allowed the 
federal government to intervene in a region during a period of emergency or when a 
region endangered the continuance of the federation, the federal parliament did not 
intervene if a regional authority seriously endangered the rights of the individual within 
that region. The position that resulted from these constitutional arrangements were that 
the ruling parties eliminated all opposition using unlawful means. In the north where the 
right to political organization was restricted by powers of chieftaincy and traditional rule, 
opposition was almost wiped out. 
The weakening of political opposition in the regions had a serious destabilizing 
effect on the federal system. A 100 percent victory in the federal elections by the 
dominant party of the north would cause it to command more seats in parliament than all 
parties in the south combined. The trend in the regions was already moving towards this 
result, and this worried the southern politicians.39 The polity cannot rely on the maturity 
37 Ernest Ogunade, Freedom of the Press: Government and Press Relationships in Nigeria (Illinois: 
University Press), 165. 
38 Ibid., note 37. 
39 Diamond, 89. 
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of the actors for democratic practice. The state institutions need to enforce restrictions on 
the politicians. The ability of the state institutions to do this is a good measure of the 
development of the state. The following examples show the weakness of the state in this 
respect. 
One great institutional weakness of the Nigerian state was revealed in the census 
of 1962. The returns from this census showed that the country's population had increased 
by 50 percent within a ten-year period. The problem was that in some regions increases 
were incredible: Lagos had increased by 133 percent, the East Region by 72 percent, and 
the Western Region by 69 percent. These figures were disputed, and a recount was 
conducted in 1963, producing int1ated figures for those areas like the North, which had 
shown lower figures in the first count.40 The census dispute was so bitter that it sowed 
seeds of mistrust for a long time to come. The state was powerless in the face of 
violation of rules by politicians who repeatedly inflated figures in an attempt to increase 
their region's strength in the federal government. 
A second example of institutional weakness was shown by the riots against 
southerners. These riots occurred in the northern city of Kano.41 A continuation of the 
bitterness of the census disputes, northern politicians began to call for the expulsion of all 
southerners, especially Ibos from the north. The Kano Native Authority issued an order 
for Ibos to leave within forty-eight hours. This was obviously illegal, but the authority 
4o Ibid., 133. 
41 Ibid, 131-161. 
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got away with it. Evictions of Ibos were registered elsewhere in Katsina and other 
northern towns. The federal premier apparently failed to solve the matter or punish the 
politicians involved, despite presentations to him by representatives of the victims.42 
The Nigerian state therefore, operated under a democratic constitution, but 
without democratic practice because the state had institutional weaknesses. It was unable 
to defend its legal framework against gross violations by ambitious politicians. The 
written law only went so far, strong state institutions were necessary if the constitutional 
provisions were to be implemented. The institutional weaknesses of the Nigerian state 
were also reflected in its relationship with the military. 
The Nigerian army had been founded on the basis of political neutrality along 
British lines. British officers commanded the army until after independence. However, 
political neutrality on the basis of military professionalism in the Huntingtonian sense 
needs to be balanced with what others such as Finer have said on the subject.43 Samuel 
Huntington implied that professionalism was sufficient to ensure the political neutrality 
of the military when he said that " ... military officer must remain neutral politically. "44. 
Finer emphasized the political environment in which the military operates, such as the 
level of "political culture. "45 The environmental factor tested the neutrality of the 
42 John Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics (Evanston: North West University Press, 1966), 
557. 
43 Ibid., note 36. 
44 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and 17u State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1995), 71. 
45 Ibid., note 36 
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Nigerian anny in 1964, when the state non-executive president, Dr Azikiwe, used his 
position as the commander-in-chief, to back his decision to annul the election results. 
The president's party had boycotted the elections, accusing an alliance led by the 
Prime Minister's party of electoral malpractice. The General Officer Commanding, Major 
General Welby-Everard, the Navy Commander, Commodore Wey and Inspector General 
of Police, Mr. Edet, had anticipated such a situation, and had taken legal advice from the 
Chief Justice, who indicated that they were under the operational command of the Prime 
Minister.46 When the President summoned them to enforce his decision to annul the 
elections, they made him aware of this position. 
The decision by the president to use the military to intervene in an election dispute 
shows that the political elite did not hesitate to use state machinery to advance personal 
political objectives. The same behavior was observed in the last section with respect to 
the use of state institutions to intimidate opposition. Either the president knew that he 
could not use the military, but was ignoring constitutional provisions, or he was ignorant 
of his constitutional role in relation to the executive institutions. Either way it shows the 
low level of political culture of the top politicians. If there had been a weak institutional 
response to the president's requirements, a major incident such as a military coup would 
probably have occurred. The chief justice, representing the judiciary, and the military 
commanders united to put the president in his constitutional position. Military control 
46 Luckham, 17le Nigerian Military 1960-67, 237. 
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was still strong because although some of the officers were in favor of supporting the 
president, they did not get the support for such a move.47 
Nevertheless, the position of the Nigerian military's political neutrality became 
weak after the British officers left command to the Nigerians. Nigerian commanders 
tended to be tied into the structures of political influence and control. Luckham reports 
that " ... the top military elite was divided by personal rivalries as well as by friendships 
between senior officers and members of the political class. "48 
The encounter between the President and the British officers described above 
reflects a glaring example of how an institution can be strengthened by a strong state. The 
ability of the British officers to defend the military institution had depended on the 
strength of the British state which they represented in Nigeria. The weakness of the· 
military institution became clear soon after the British Officers left. When political riots 
took place such as the ones at Kano, which were described above, soldiers participated by 
taking sides, yet the soldiers got away with such an professional behavior.49 
D. THE EFFECT OF THE SOCIETY 
This section focuses on the ability of the society to support structures for regional 
integration. Is the society empowered by literacy, individual incomes and private capital 
47 Ibid., p. 238. 
48 Ibid., p. 239. 
49 Ibid., p. 299. 
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to withstand the forces for division. To this effect social empowennent means the socio-
economic foundations for a society to concern itself with issues of governance. 
The political organization of Nigeria varies between the north and the south. In 
the north, the traditional leadership of the sultan of Sokoto and the emirs under him is 
absolute. An aristocracy called sarakuna developed around this leadership. It rules over 
the lower classes called the talakawa. Membership in each class is generally fixed at 
birth. The north was the last of the three regions to modernize. It started to modernize 
when self-rule became imminent in the 1950s. It had become clear that if it did not 
modernize, it would be dominated in the federal bureaucracy by the southerners who had 
adopted western education earlier. 
When the north started to modernize, it selected the members of the aristocracy, 
and kept the rest of the population in a backward state. A new class of elite that did not 
owe allegiance to the emirs emerged from this modernization process. It was easy for this 
elite to form an alliance with the traditional rulers. Through the use of traditional control, 
this alliance was able to hold the north as a united region in competition with the southern 
region. Since the constitution required that political power be obtained through elections, 
political aspirants had to seek favors from the emirs so that the emir could then extract 
the votes from his subjects, and this he did using intimidation and patronage. The 
electoral candidate had to show that when elected he would be able to extract resources 
from the political process. The electorate was kept in line through a process of coercion 
and patronage by both the emir and by the politician. With this social background, the 
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traditions of northern society were not able to contribute democratic practice to the 
federal polity. 
The Yoruba society of the western region was also hierarchical in structure, but a 
Yoruba monarch is elected by a council of chiefs. Moreover, an unpopular monarch can 
be deposed by the chiefs. There are no distinct classes in Yoruba society, and the royals 
are not necessarily wealthier than the non-royals. A high premium was placed on hard 
work, personal achievement, and ·occupational excellence. 50 
The Ibo of eastern Nigeria were even less hierarchical, lacking centralized 
kingship institutions. Organization was around the village, and the village representative 
assembly was its main political organ with each village remaining autonomous. All adult 
male members and some notable women took part in political debate. At the individual 
level, " ... hard work, self assertiveness, enterprise, individualism and personal 
achievement were stressed."51 The significance of the traditional mode of political 
organization for the three main ethnic groups is important for the integration of the 
Nigerian society. 'fl:lere was not much commonality in the traditional political 
organization of the ethnic groups that could be the basis of Nigerian political integration. 
· The Nigerian politicians themselves knew this, and accepted the fact by adopting the 
British parliamentary system. The parliamentary system was acceptable to both parties 
since there was no Nigerian traditional system to adopt and the parliamentary system had 
50 Crawford Young, "Nigeria a Political Entity and a Society." article in Berkett and Young, eds., 
Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, 53. 
51 Ibid., p. 54. 
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international legitimacy. However, the Nigerian society lacked the modem basis upon 
which to create the national consensus required for a parliamentary system to function. 
At independence, Nigeria was in the bottom 20 percent of the 100 poorest countries in the 
world.52 As shown by Table 2, the majority of Nigerians were illiterate peasants. The 
mass of the unemployed and rural peasants lived in abject poverty to which those who 
had escaped would not want to return. 
Peasants 90%of 
total pop. 
Literacy 5.7% of 
pop. 
Per capita income $130 
Manufacturing 6%of 
GDP 





Table 2: Socio-economic Data of Nigeria (1965)53 
52 James Coleman, Nigeria; Background to Nationalism (Berkerley:University of Carlifomia Press, 1960), 
141-161. 
53 Economic Data from The World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth 
(Washington: World Bank, 1993), 224-225. 
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Table 2: Socio-economic Data of Nigeria (1965)53 
A society at this level of existence is powerless to control a powerful group like 
politicians. The people would probably be too busy on the more pressing problems of 
subsistence, and would submit to any promises of a better life. Those who migrated to 
the cities turned to members of their own cultural groups for psychological and 
sociological solidarity. It is from those who had secured good jobs or made it in business 
that the elite emerged. Neither the traditional forms of governance, nor the existing 
socio-economic conditions equipped the Nigerian society to enforce institutional controls 
on the politicians. The politicians possessed the education and the material conditions 
that enabled them to make the moral claim to lead. In this environment, a politician was 
assured of support from his ethnic base in the struggle against opponents. Patron-client 
relationships therefore developed between the political class and their ethnic bases. What 
the political elite had in common was the realization that control of the state was vital for 
political survival. Through government contacts of all kind, the state was the source of 
~nrichment for those who occupied political office. At the federal level, the member of 
parliament was not concerned with strengthening the state, but to find what could be got 
from it for himself and his ethnic clients. Alternative to such communal connections 
would be class connections that provide integration between the classes from different 
ethnic backgrounds. Private capital accumulation was weak, therefore the state was 
53 Economic Data from The World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth 
(Washington: World Bank, 1993), 224-225. 
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responsible for the regulatory and distributive function making the political class who are 
the champions of the state to be very powerful. Nigeria therefore, became a very corrupt 
society, while the state became a very weak state. 
According to the findings in this section, the lack of ethnic integration in Nigeria 
was caused by the existence of ethnic patron-client relationships that connected the 
political class to a base of supporters. If the ethnic basis were literate and self-reliant 
economically, the political class would mobilize on a different base from the ethnic one. 
The socio-economic conditions of the peasantry ensured that the majority of people were 
not integrated horizontally with other ethnic groups. It also ensured that they had no 
other means of advancing themselves other than through their ethnic elite who 
represented them to the state. The ordinary people were like a captive market for political 
entrepreneurs. The problem was not the entrepreneur, but the low level of societal 
development as shown by the conditions of poverty, illiteracy and weak private capital 
that enabled such a situation to exist. 
The weak political culture of the society affected the institutions of the state. The 
Civil service, the police, army and the judiciary were all weakened by political 
interference. There was favoritism in promotions on the basis of nepotism and ethnicity. 
The cumulative effect of this tribalism is that it sowed mistrust, causing anxiety and 
insecurity among the entire bureaucracy including the military. For example, in the 
W estem Region, there was a calculated use of tribal statistics by politicians to effect 
appointments in the public corporations. Chief Akintola made use of such statistics in a 
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white paper entitled "The New Political Alignment in the Western Nigeria. "54 It claimed 
that the Ibos dominated the public corporations such as the Nigeria Railways, the Ports 
Authority and the University of Ibadan. In Eastern Nigeria, the regional government 
presented its grievances in the following manner: 
Take a look at what they have done with the little power we surrendered to 
them to preserve a unity that does not exist: 
-Kainji Dam Project- about $1~0 million of our money when 
completed- all in the North. 
-Bornu Railway extension-about $75 million of our money when 
completed all in the north. 
-Spending over $50 million on the Northern Nigerian Army in the 
name of the Federal Republic. 
-Military training and all munitions factories and installations are 
based in the North, thereby using your money to train northerners 
to fight southerners .... 
-Now they have refused to allow the building of an iron and steel 
industry in the east and paid experts to produce a distorted report.55 
There was a rumor that Northerners were planning a coup to replace the federal 
Prime Minister, Sir Abu Baker, with Sir Ahmadu Bello, who was at the time the Northern 
Premier.56 This was possible because the federal premiership of Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa had been negotiated between the parties, and had been given to a more acceptable 
54 Diamond, 143. 
55 Quoted in Mackintosh. Nigerian Government and Politics, 557. 
56 Quoted in Luckham, 41. 
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figure rather than to Ahmadu Bello, to whom it should have been given since he was the 
leader of the ruling party. There was so much mistrust that even rumor could be taken for 
fact. This particular rumor had very serious consequences for the Nigerian army and the 
nation, because it led to a pre-emptive military coup in January, 1966. It was a bloody 
coup in which the leadership of the ruling coalition, which included the federal premier 
and two regional premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello And Chief Akintola of the Western Region, 
were killed. The prominence of Ibo officers among the coup leaders caused a rumor to 
spread that it was a coup to assert the domination of the Ibos. The Army split into ethnic 
camps, such that a counter coup in May 1966 sparked a civil war which lasted for two 
and half years. 
The military coup itself may not be the point of interest here, but rather the 
manner in which it exposed the divisions in the military which were on political and 
ethnic lines. The military lost its internal legitimacy as the military governor of Eastern 
Nigeria, Col. Ojukwu, suggests about taking orders from the capital Lagos: 
... Whoever you put in Lagos, I say this, will not command the loyalty of 
the East if that person is not acceptable to the East, this the fact of today. 
So many things have happened and we no longer trust each other.57 
Clearly the Nigerian military was now divided internally and as such it failed to be 
an instrument of national integration. 
57 Ibid., p. 149. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
What really caused the Nigerian military to fail as an instrument of integration? 
Horizontal integration may be used as a measure of the level of development of the 
political elite, because it reflects interests emanating from common social and 
commercial linkages. Such linkages in a country as large and diverse as Nigeria, come 
with modernization. Cross-voting can be used to measure the modernity of the political 
elite because it would be expected that politics reflects social and economic interests. 
Using cross-voting as a measure of elite development, it was found that the regions in 
Nigeria voted as blocks with little support for candidates whose party leadership was 
based outside their region. Thus, cross-voting was low, reflecting a low level of elite 
modernization. 
The policies towards the military reflected that the political elite had strong elite 
security maps. The military was required to give preferential treatment in recruitment to 
the north. Northern politicians made speeches about building a military that was deemed 
safe using ethnic criteria. These policies sowed seeds of mistrust and insecurity within 
the military itself. 
With respect to the state, the level of development of the state can be measured by 
the strength of its institutions. Do politicians break the law, and are they subsequently not 
held accountable? The Nigerian state revealed low levels of development through the 
non-observance of the rule of law. The political process was marred by the intimidation 
of opponents and the rigging of official census and electoral figures. There was a high 
level of corruption, abuse of power, unlawful dismissal on the grounds of ethnic origin 
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and political murders by people who were known, but the state was powerless to deal 
with these problems. These data are taken to be evidence of a weak and underdeveloped 
state. 
The example of a strong institution had been provided by British military officers 
with regard to the constitutional crisis in which the president wanted to back his position 
with military force. The officers politely advised the president of the constitutional 
position with regard to the operational use of the military. The military institution started 
to weaken soon after the British left. Senior officers were developing friendships with 
selected senior politicians. Military discipline declined as seen by soldiers participating 
in factional fights and politically inspired riots. The institutional weakness of t.he state 
soon weakened the military's ability to be seen as a neutral force which could be an 
instrument of national integration. 
Nigerian society demonstrated a low level of development because it was feudal 
in the north, peasant, illiterate and poor. It was therefore subject to manipulation by the 
political elite who used intimidation and patronage to ensure loyalty. Military 
organization was not strong enough to resist the culture of corruption and patronage 
networks which had infected the society. Suspicion and tension, which were prevalent in 
the bureaucracy, soon affected the military as well. The coup of January 1966 was an 
example of how the split along ethnic lines in the society had affected the military. The 
military was also split and the society began to drift towards civil war. The Nigerian 
military had failed to be an instrument of national integration. 
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III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL 
INTEGRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
South Africa was not colonized in the in the same way that Nigeria and other 
African countries were colonized. When the European countries decided how to colonize 
Africa at the Berlin conference in 1884, South Africa was already incorporated in the 
world economy, selling gold, copper and agricultural products such as wool. South 
Africa was comprised of four self-governing territories, the Transvaal, the Orange Free 
State, the Cape of Good Hope and Natal. The first European settlers who arrived at the 
Cape of Good. Hope were Dutch traders who in 1652 set up a halfway station for their 
trade with India. ·As a result of war between England and France, the English captured 
the station from the Dutch because the Dutch were allied to the French. 
- Since then, the development of South Africa has been linked to competition 
between the descendants of the Dutch settlers on one side and the English on the other. 
The Dutch settlers, also called Boers (a Dutch word which means farmers because of their 
major pre-occupation) evolved to form a distinct ethnic ~roup called the Afrikaner. They 
called themselves Afrikaner because of the culture and language which had evolved over 
the years of settlement in Africa. The differences between the English and the Afrikaner 
were responsible for the creation of the four republics mentioned above. In 1910, after a 
war between these groups, they agreed to unite under the Union of South Africa, a self-
governing colony under British int1uence. 
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After World Wa.r II, African nationalism became very important in the history of 
South Africa because the blacks began to demand majority rule. They clashed with 
Afrikaner nationalism that wanted a republic in South Africa in which the Afrikaner 
dominated. In 1948 in a general election in which only whites voted, a new right-wing 
Afrikaner dominated party, called the National Pa.rty, won. It immediately had to deal 
with the race issue, which at the time meant formulating a policy towa.rds black 
nationalism, the demand for majority rule. 
The national party adopted a policy called apartheid, or sepa.rate development of 
the races. In practice this policy resulted in giving racism official status, where by the 
black people would receive low-class treatment in the economy and social services only 
in designated a.reas which were sepa.rated from white a.reas. The policy did not work as 
had been planned because the majority of South Africans who viewed the policy to be 
racist actively opposed it. However, considerable modernization of the country took 
place during the exclusive rule by the Afrikaner nationalist party, which lasted for forty-
four yea.rs. 
The composition of the military in 1992 was very complicated. First, there was 
the South Africa Defense Force (SADF), and five different a.rmies created to protect the 
black peoples' homelands, which had been created as pa.rt of the sepa.rate development 
policy of apartheid. In addition to these were the forces of the liberation movement, the 
Umkhonto Wesizwe (MK) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). 
The current military, which is a result of the integration of the forces mentioned 
above, is called the South Africa National Defense Force (SANDF). The success of the 
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integration process which resulted in a unified military, bears testimony to the arguments 
of this study which are that the high level of development encouraged national 
integration. The next sections will assess the effect on the level of development by the 
elite, the State, and the society on the potential of the SANDF to be an instrument of 
national integration. 
B. THE EFFECT OF THE ELITE 
The major political players in South Africa are the African National Congress 
(ANC), the National Party (NP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). There are also 
fifteen other political parties, of which the Pan African Congress, the Democratic Party 
and the Freedom Front provide a signifi,cant blend in the ideological spectrum of South 
African politics. 
Historically, the contentious issues in South African politics have been 
represented by the ideologies of the ANC and the National Party. Until the 1990s, the 
political history of South Africa was dominated by discussions about whether to 
introduce majority rule, which meant black rule, o.r to continue with minority rule, which 
meant white rule. Apartheid was invented to solve this problem by creating a separate 
white homeland and several ethnic-based black homelands in which both races would 
become majorities in their own areas. That was supposed to solve the minority-rule 
versus majority-rule issue forever. 
Assuming that the politicians who formulated racial segregation had noble 
intentions of conflict resolution, the problem that arose with this formula was that 
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resource apportionment could not easily be distributed fairly. Without fairness the policy 
was recognized as institutionalized racism, and it therefore became a source of conflict in 
South African society. Today the South Afric3:11 political elite comprise individuals who 
belong to groups which fought against each other for almost a century. The formation of 
the ANC, which dates as far back as 1912, was formed to oppose the government laws of 
the Union of South Africa that were increasingly discriminatory to the Africans. The 
ANC's argument was that since the black people were indigenous and in the majority, and 
the whites were in the minority, the right to rule belonged to the black people. 
Successive white governments responded to African opposition by intensifying 
apartheid. It was made official policy after the National Party came to power in 1948. 
Opposition to apartheid increased and the state responded by stiffening the laws to protect 
apartheid Pierre du Toit reports the banning of no fewer than 98 organizations between 
1950 and 1988, and the detention of as many as 73,000 individuals between 1960 and 
1988.58 
The other four political parties, the lnkatha Freedom Party (IFP) the Pan African 
Congress (PAC), the Democratic Party (DP) and Freedom Party (FP) also emerged to 
represent each side of the ANC and the NP. The ANC, which was more radical, called 
for majority rule immediately while the IFP suggested a moderate reform orientation. 
The IFP quickly lost support in the 1980s as more people began to support the ANC's 
stand. It later began to look more like a Zulu ethnic party. 
58 Pierre du Toit, State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa (Washington: The U.S. Institute for 
Peace Press, 1995), 185. 
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The Democratic Party was liberal white, and represented mostly English-speaking 
people, whereas the Freedom Front represented the more right-wing Afrikaners. The 
ANC won the election of 1994, followed by the National party, and the IFP was third. 
The rest of the parties obtained each, less than 5 percent of the vote. The three most 
successful parties, the ANC, the NP and the IFP formed a coalition government. 
In order to assess the level of development of the political elite, the researcher 
used cross-ethnic voting to evaluate the ability of this elite to effectively campaign and 
obtain acceptability in each of the regions. The results at Table 3 show the percentage of 
the votes obtained by the three most successful parties in each region. 
Area EC ET KZN NWC NC NT OFS GTN WC Var 
ANC .84 .81 .31 .83 .49 .92 .77 .59 .33 .04 
IFP .002 .015 .48 .004 .004 .001 .006 .04 .006 .02 
NP .I .1 .1 .1 .4 .03 .14 .27 .56 .03 
Table 3: Cross-ethnic Voting in the South African Election of 199459 
All the parties contested in all the provinces and obtained some votes. The 
winning party, the ANC, won in 7 out of 9 provinces obtaining over 30 percent of the 
votes in each province. Also the range of variances, which look at the spread by the 
electorate's preferences between the parties is close at 0.2 i.e.,(0.4-0.2). The level of 
cross-ethnic voting indicated by the level of acceptability of the winning party in each 
59 Data adapted from R. W. Johnson and L. Schlemmer, Launching Democracy in South Africa: The First 
Open Election, April 1994 (New .Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 377-401. 
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region and the spread of support for each party shows that the level of development for 
the political elite is high. It is high because for a political party to be accepted across the 
ethnic divide, its leadership must be propagating a non ethnic based political agenda. 
This shows the level of political maturity in the country. 
A survey of elite attitudes towards civic and public organization conducted by 
Rennie Kotze and Pierre du Toit is illustrated at Table 4. The results of the survey 
supported the election results by ~howing that the South African elite is more oriented to 
ideological than to ethnic sources of political differences. 
The data are from a 1992 sample of 2282 positional elite. The following 
Question was put to the respondents: " Please indicate how sympathetic or 
unsympathetic you feel towards the following institutions." The choices 
were presented as a Lickert-type scale measuring "very sympathetic," 
"sympathetic," neutral,"· "unsympathetic," and "very unsympathetic." 
Forty six variables were included in the factor analysis, which is a 
statistical technique for determining the degree to which a set of variables 
is part of a set of common underlying phenomenon. The closer the 
numerical value of each reading to 1.00, the stronger the underlying 
commonality. In this case the common phenomenon is the extent to which 
civic institutions are perceived to coalesce with political institutions into a 
cluster of bodies to which individuals either are or are not attracted. Six 
such clusters (factors) were identified with {'rinciple component extraction 
with orthogonal rotation, the first three together explained 28.9 percent of 
the variation. The cut off point of 0.5 was used in the analysis. 60 
60 From du To it, 189. 
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Factor1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor4 Factors Factors 
State Alternative State Liberals Right Wing Co-op tees Africanist 
Organizations 
Broederbond 0.79115 
Fedrasie Afrikaanse Kultuur 0.78040 
NG-Church (Dutch Refonn) 0.75515 
Afrikaanse Handelsistituut 0.71416 
Afrikaans Press 0.70027 
SA Broadcasting Corporation (TV) 0.68375 
National Party 0.65142 
House of Assembly 0.63156 
SA Defence Force 0.59076 
Big Business 0.58399 
Civil service 0.56656 
State president 0.52991 
SA Agricultural Union 0.52527 
Courts 0.50961 
Conference of SA Trade Unions 0.76303 
Umkhonto we Sizwe 0.76131 
African National Congress 0.73014 
National Education Coordination Committee 0.72499 
SA communist Party 0.72217 
Civics 0.71612 
SA Council of Churches 0.71445 
Soweto People's Delegation 0.71345 
People's Defence Committees 0.68695 
Alternative media 0.58123 
Democratic Party 0.70286 
Institute of Multi-Party Democracy 0.68552 
Urban Foundation 0.65821 
Inst Democratic Alternative for SA 0.59861 
SA chamber of Business 0.59861 
English Prss 0.55936 
Afrikaner-Weernstandsbewegings 0.82217 
Conservative Party 0.79499 
Afrikaner-Volkswag 0.76401 
House of Delegates 0.66530 
House of Representatives 0.64587 
Homeland Leaders o.53n9 
lnkatha Freedom Party 0.51365 
Azanian People's Organization 0.73980 
Pan African Congress 0.73640 
National Council of Trade Unions 0.52650 
Percentage of Variance 28.9 17.3 6.9 3.5 2.7 2.7 
Table 4: Factor Analysis: Elite Attitudes Toward Civic and Public Organizations61 
61 Ibid., 190-191. 
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Table 4 shows that when South Africa began the transition in 1992, it was an 
extremely divided country. Some people supported the existing state that was represented 
by the National Party as shown in Factor 1. Others supported extreme views such a 
purely Africanist view as shown by Factor 6. Very important is the intensity with which a 
particular cluster held its views, as shown by the each variance. The Africanists held the 
most inflexible position with a variance of 2.7, though fortunately they were not the main 
contenders on that side. However, the supporters of the state with a variance of 28.9 and 
their main opponents with 17.3 were both flexibly sympathetic to their ideologies. When 
views of opponents show this level of flexibility, it reveals an opportunity for conflict 
resolution since each side has room for accepting a different view. 
Further, the survey revealed that in each category, there was no correlation 
between support for the type of state preferred and a particular ethnic group. For 
example, among Afrikaner, some preferred a right-wing racist state, while others wanted 
reforms. Among the Africans, people within an ethnic group took different positions 
along the political spectrum. For example among the Zulu-ethnic group, some supported 
the Bantustans represented by Factor 5 while many others supported Factor 2. In each 
cluster there was a strong presence of civil society, which shows that social issues 
dominated the agendas of political agitation. If ideology has superceded ethnicity as a 
basis for mobilization in South Africa, it would show a high level of development of the 
political elite. Such a high level of elite development would also have a positive effect on 
the military as well. 
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An example of the effect of the level of development of the elite was shown by 
the success of the integration process of the many forces that existed before 1994 into the 
SANDF. Of particular significance was the convergence of ideas on the nature of a 
national military as opposed to a liberation movement, or to one which serves ethnic 
interests, as the SADF was. At a seminar organized by the Royal institute of International 
Affairs UK, the commander of Umkhonto Wesizwe (MK), Mr. Joe Modise drew respect 
from his opposition in the SADF concerning defense matters.62 Through such 
understanding, it was possible for the Mk and the SADF to be integrated, and for the 
SADF to accept the need for affirmative action, which was being extended to the MK 
personnel. This understanding percolated down to the middle ranks of both armies. 
Why was it easy for the government forces to reach consensus with the military 
elite of the liberation forces? The answer lies in the convergence of ideas regarding 
integration, ideas not only from the military, but also those held by the political elite. 
First there was the political elite who were in agreement as to the direction of the 
military integration. The absence of elite security mapping made it easier for the military 
to adopt professional approach to integration. Secondly was the military itself, because it 
served their corporate purpose to succeed in integrating the forces. It is difficult to 
achieve the second without the first. Joe Modise emphasized the need for re-training of 
all the former non-conventional forces in order to fit in a national army. 
62 William Frank Gutteridge, The Military in South African Politics: Champions of National Unity? 
( London: RISCT, 1994 ), 7. 
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The success of the integration of the various forces, which had supported political 
parties before, was due to the political elite not having transferred elite-security maps into 
the military. Elite security maps did not enter the military because the political elite had 
reached a level of development which allowed them to organize despite ethnic politics. 
We saw earlier that political support was clustered around ideological and not political 
positions.63 Since there is no basis for the political elite to organize around ethnicity, the 
military has a chance to be professional if it is not interfered with by the politicians. 
C. THEEFFECTOFTHESTATE 
Parliamentary democracy began very early in South Africa, starting at the Cape of 
Good Hope in 1872, when this British Colony was granted responsible government. 
Responsible government allowed for the establishment of a Parliament of the settler 
representatives to assist the resident governor in administering the a colony. The Boer 
Republics in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal also established some form of 
elected representations. The first all South Africa government was established in 1910 as 
the government of the Union of South Africa, with a Parliament at Cape Town and seat of 
government in Pretoria. The republican government was set up in 1961, and majority 
rule achieved in 1994. 
The importance of this is that South Africa has been ruled through the institution 
of parliament for well over one hundred years. This is significant because, when the 
transition to majority rule constitution was drawn up, it was by the South Africans 
63 Ibid., note 57. 
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themselves rather than by a colonial power. The interests of a colonial power wishing to 
extricate itself from a colonial responsibility do not necessarily coincide with the interests 
of those who will have to live with the constitution after ward. 
From this history then, it is clear that the state institutions and the government 
were established in South Africa through the legislative process. The unfortunate aspect 
is that the democracy was applied only to the white population before 1992. The 
democracy of 1992-1998 benefited from the institutions and the culture of democratic 
practice that had existed for whites for 300 years, starting at the Cape of Good Hope, 
gradually spreading to the whole country, and consolidating with the formation of the 
union in 1910. 
The creation of an indigenous democracy such as in South Africa did not occur in 
the other countries of sub-Saharan Africa, such as Nigeria. Over the years, starting with 
European settlements, state institutions have been built which have acted as controls on 
the behavior of politicians. The first victim of institutional control was the ruling party in 
September 1996. The ruling party had made proposals that required party representation 
in the constitutional "watch dog" committees,.and had also wanted a relative dilution of 
powers of provincial governments. The constitutional court overruled the ruling party's 
proposals and President Mandela accepted the ruling of the constitutional court. 64 
The greatest test of institutional control on politicians also occurred with respect 
to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
64 Mary Braid, "Tutu Report, Legal Move Splits ANC", The Independent. 31 October, 1998.Available 
[Lexis/Nexis] 6 December 1998. 
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The TRC's main tasks are to apportion reparations to victims, to grant 
amnesty to perpetrators, and to compile an official history of the nation's 
transition from raw repression to majority rule.65 
Since numerous. human rights violations had occurred in defense of and 
opposition to apartheid, the success of the TRC was dependent on the candid 
participation of everyone involved. The truth is obviously difficult to obtain when people 
are forced to expose crimes and embarrassing actions attributed to them. It is even worse 
if they believe that their actions were in pursuit of a just cause. The ANC which was the 
ruling party at the time, had violated the rights of some people, believing that they were 
pursuing a just cause. In such cases, the easiest strategy to take is often to use the power 
one has to s·hield one's actions from the truth. 
Vice President and President designate Thabo Mbeki, who has since taken over 
the leadership of the ANC, spearheaded a move to block the TRC report. He argued that 
the ANC's actions could not be compared with those of supporters of apartheid, because 
according to him, their cause was just. The ANC lost the court case on the grounds that 
the basis of the TRC was not political positioning, but rather about the violation of 
individual rights, regardless of the political motive. The chairman of the TRC, himself a 
supporter of the ANC during the struggle for liberation, said that " ... the fact that they are 
the majority party does not give them privileges."66 The point this illustrates is that 
65 John Streamlau, A House No Longer Divided: Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South 
Africa ( New York: Carnegy Commission, 1997), 8-24. 
66 Ibid. 
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politicians will often want to break the rules for political capital. In this case the vice-
president was appealing to the ANC's hard-liners, but in South Africa institutions like the 
courts are strong enough to stop the politicians from flouting the law, as they did in this 
case. 
Institutional control had a history in the South African military as in other spheres 
of political life. The most critical instrument that legalizes the creation of an instrument 
of violence and guides its use is the Defense Act. The Defense Act sets out the military's 
mandate and how it is to be governed. The first Defense Act of South Africa dates back 
to 1912. It was debated in parliament whether to allow South Africa to join the British 
and Western Allies against Germany in 1914. Although the SADF had .been an 
instrument of Afrikaner interests, it had operated within a system of ~aws. With respect 
to these laws, like other organs of government, the SADF was a solid institution. While 
the SADF had implemented policies that had a raci?J bias, it had done so on the basis of 
these laws originating from a legally constituted government. 
The SADF demonstrated this on two occasions. One was the transfer of power 
from President P. W. Botha to President F.W. deKlerk in 1980. During Botha's regime, a 
policy called the "Total Strategy" was put in force to respond to increasing pressure on 
the apartheid regime. The security forces had by this policy been made central to the 
accomplishment of the goals of this strategy. The new president implemented many 
reforms that included the removal of the military from the role of central policy-making 
in government. Despite the fact that it endured forced retirement of officers, loss of 
prestige and re-assignment of roles, the military supported the reforms. The military even 
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supported the transition to majority rule, whereby their former enemies were to assume 
power and be their directors. Further more it took the lead in ensuring that the transition 
to majority rule was peaceful. This behavior of the military shows that institutional 
control not only operated in the government and bureaucracy, but extended to the military 
as well. During the more difficult period of military integration in support of the 
transition to majority rule in South Africa, the strength of institutional control became 
valuable. Obviously, they supported all these changes because they had a culture of 
institutional support for the rule of law, which is a characteristic of an elite that has 
reached a high level of development. 
D. THE EFFECT OF THE SOCIETY 
1. Elimination of Peasants · 
A crucial argument in this study is that peasantry, poverty and illiteracy create 
conditions for politicians to manipulate the population through patronage and 
intimidation. The reason that the politicians "care" about the peasants is because the 
peasants have the vote by which they can select from among the competing elite. In 
South Africa, the mass of rural peasantry was eliminated by many years of apartheid 
policies to the extent that politicians have to rely more on the urban vote. Apartheid had 
dispossessed the peasants of land and confined them to reserves, which lost value because 
of .overcrowding. This forced the peasants to become wage earners. The former 
peasantry in South Africa is therefore a rural proletariat because income comes from 
either the urban migrant labor of the males, or the labor provided on commercial farms. 
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These proletarians are not as manipulable as subsistence peasants because they do not 
expect to rely on resources extracted from the state by the politicians. 
As early as 1900, there was competition for labor among white farms, the mines 
and industry. A commission was set up by the Union Government to investigate the 
problem. The recommendation of this commission was the Native Land Act of 1913. 
From that point on, the peasantry in South Africa was set on the path to extinction. 
Mining, commerce and agriculture cooperated in search of cheap labor. The peasantry's 
land became smaller with the expansion of commercial agriculture. The youths migrated 
to the farms and to the mines to look for work, as poverty increased in the areas reserved 
for peasant settlement. Liv·e stock diseases and frequent droughts depleted the reserves of 
any kind of potential subsistence to the peasants. Table 5 shows the number of peasants 
who emigrated from one reserve area, called Transkei, to both the mining areas and the 





Table 5: Patterns of Labor Migration from Transkei, 1893-191667 
67 Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997), 121 
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The main effect of the land-tenure policies was to transform the reserves into 
dormitories for labor supply, and to transform the peasantry over the years into a 
proletariat. The political fallout of this process is that politicians have had to campaign 
on the basis of issues that affect working class-people. The basis for economic and 
political dependency, which is the breeding ground for patron-client relationships, was 
destroyed over the years by raising the levels of development among the people from 
peasantry to proletariat. The other important development was the weakening of ethnicity 
as the basis of political organization because of urbanization and proletarianization. 
Further evidence for this is found in the history of the ANC. First, of all the political 
parties formed to champion for independence in Sub-Saharan Africa, the ANC is not only 
the oldest, but it was also the only independence movement that did not split on ethnic 
lines during the liberation struggle. Second, of all the political parties that waged an 
armed fight for independence, the ANC was the only one whose main military strategy 
was urban warfare. All the other armed movements in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, 
Namibia were rural because of the prevalence of the peasantry there. 
2. KwaZulu-Natal 
The role of the level of societal development can be made clearer by a quick 
review of the role of ethnicity and the political society of the province of KwaZulu-Natal 
before colonialism. The Zulu people had ruled most of the Area now called Natal 
through a monarchy. Colonialism and implementation of the Land Areas Act of 1913 
(described above) confined this kingdom to a large reserve called KwaZulu. .The 
apartheid policy of converting the larger of these reserves into nation-states called 
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Bantustans had caused KwaZulu to act in the capacity of a state. Unlike other 
Bantustans, KwaZulu had refused to accept independence on the terms set by the 
apartheid rules. A charismatic cousin of the Zulu monarch called Gatsha Buthelezi had 
fanned a political party called the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), to oppose apartheid 
through peaceful resistance. This policy ran counter to the ANC policy of armed 
struggle. When the ban on the ANC was lifted under the new political dispensations, 
there were clashes for political supremacy in ~waZulu-Natal. The IFP was able to assert 
itself in the Bantustan part of KwaZulu-Natal, but failed to gain support in the 
commercial and urban areas of Natal. 
Two important points arise out of the politics of KwaZulu-Natal. The Zulu 
people, a culturally cohesive ethnic group, supported two different political ~ovements. 
The proletariat Zulu, were no longer under the traditional rule of the monarch and their 
social and economic conditions required a different political approach. Second, the IFP 
employed tactics of intimidation in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, but was unsuccessful 
except in the Bantustan part of the province. 
The lesson from the analysis above on KwaZulu is that commercialization, 
urbanization and education can unite people around issues other than ethnicity as the 
proletarian Zulus did in joining other South Africans with similar views to support the 
ANC. Moreover, where a population is less developed as in the KwaZulu Bantustan, an 
ethnically based political party can successfully use intimidation and patronage to coerce 
the subjects into supporting it. 
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Using this analogy, just as the ANC failed to penetrate KwaZulu Bantustan, the 
Nigerian political parties of the early l 960's failed to penetrate the regional base of their 
rivals. Chief Awolowo of the Nigerian Action Group was more vigorous in this strategy 
of trying to extend his party nationally, just as Nelson Mandela did. Mandela was 
successful because his political landscape had undergone over 300 years of 
proletarianization, which had not occured in Nigeria. Under the same conditions as in 
Nigeria, Nelson Mandela would probably have failed too. His failure in KwaZulu makes 
this point even clear. 
3. Afrikaner Ethnic Group 
Ethnic politics and p·atronage can be illustrated by following the history of politics 
in South Africa. As a result of the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, the Afrikaners did not 
want South Africa to be part of the British Empire. The majority of Afrikaners were 
farmers or low skilled workers. Compared to their English counterparts, they were 
poorer, less educated and more rural. The Afrikaner leaders wanted to change this 
situation by ruling the state and then using the state to improve their ethnic community. 
The only way they could capture the state was to use their numerical superiority over the 
. English. To realize this, they had to accomplish two tasks. One was to mobilize all 
Afrikaners behind the National Party on an ethnic basis, a move that would ensure 
superiority over the English on the basis of numbers. To make this superiority 
permanent, the next task was to ensure that other races were disenfranchised. This 
process of racial segregation and disenfranchisement, called apartheid by the leaders of 
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the Afrikaner ethnic group was a scheme devised by them to dominate other ethnic 
groups. 
The South African economy during the days of the Union of South Africa after 
1910 was mainly extractive. Farming and mining were the bases of the economy, and 
therefore cheap labor was essential to minimizing costs. It was easy for the Afrikaner 
party, the National Party, to mobilize the farmers and the unskilled workers to support 
segregationist policies against the blacks. The white farmers were assured protection 
from the competition for land, and the supply of cheap farm labor. The white workers 
were protected from competition for jobs and the possible erosion of wages. English 
capitalists, who owned the mines, benefited from lower input costs overall.· As long as 
the socio-economic conditions were at this low level of development, the system was in 
equilibrium. 
In 1948, the National Party achieved its objectives of seizing political power with 
the support of the farmers and the workers. Adam and Giliomee report that the National 
Party got support from " ... economically depressed areas, poorer farmers, unemployed 
poor whites' of small towns. "68 The political power that the Afrikaner Nationalists won 
was a result of a burning desire to raise their socio-economic status. 
The years since 1948, saw a fundamental transformation in the South African 
economy, from an extractive, to an industrial and a service oriented one. There were 
large changes in the relative cost configuration of the economy causing a growth in the 
68 Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 268. 
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requirement for skilled relative to unskilled labor. The white workers became artificially 
expensive since their labor market was protected by apartheid policies. Also the relative 
economic power between the Afrikaners and their English counterparts had significantly 
changed. The economic forces behind Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid had weakened 
significantly resulting in apartheid being abolished in 1992. 
The lesson that arises from the history of Afrikaner power and that of politics in 
KwaZulu is that ethnic mobilization is successful at lower levels of development, since 
the political elite can utilize patronage and intimidation to ensure support. To support the 
National Party, the Afrikaner political elite intimidated its ethnic base with propaganda 
regarding a communist and a black danger. However, it is ·important to realize that 
Afrikaner patronage was practiced where more socio-economic transformation had 
occurred than is ordinarily found in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. The patronage did 
not fundamentally undermine the bureaucratic capa.city of the state as it does in the less 
developed countries of Africa. Nevertheless, the analogy of patron-client relationships 
and low levels of development still holds with respect to the pre-capitalist communities of 
South Africa discussed above. South African society is now at a high level of 
development as shown by Table 6 below. 
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Peasantry Less than 30% 
of the pop. 
Per-capita income $900 
Literacy 82% of pop. 
Commerce 3% of GDP 
Mining 11% of GDP 
Agriculture 5.8% of GDP 
Services 49% of GDP 
Industry 22% of GDP 
GDP $19bn 
Table 6: Socio-economic data for South Africa in 1994.69 
South Africa is . now a developed country as shown by the size of the 
manufacturing and services sectors compared to the extractive (agriculture and mining) 
sectors. There is a strong capitalist economy supported by a largely proletariat labor and a 
strong middle class. Such a society is capable of supporting democracy and strong state 
institutions. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The comparatively high level of development of the South African elite, of the 
state and of society helped the military integrate within itself, thus establishing the 
69 Gerald Cubitt and Peter Joyce, Journey Through South Africa ( Cape Town: Stuik Publishers, 1995), 5-
15. 
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potential for being an instrument of national integration. Evidence shows .that the 
political elite is not driven by ethnic considerations, because their power bases push for 
social issues. For example the ANC is backed by organizations such as the Confederation 
of Trade Unions, and the South African Council of Churches. The Democratic Party is 
backed by the South African Chamber of Commerce. Membership in an ethnic group did 
not automatically associate a person with membership in a political party. An assessment 
of cross-ethnic voting for the 1994 elections s~ows that the major parties had little 
variance in their support from the different regions. 
Concerning the effect of the state, the South African state has been based on 
parliamentary democracy for over 100 years. Although the laws were applied 
segregatively, the culture of due process and the rule of law had evolved and was already 
firmly established before the period under consideration. 
This culture of institutional rule was also applied to the military. For example, 
before the military was engaged in any war, the consent of parliament was always sought. 
The military always obeyed the orders from the government of the day. With this 
background experience, the military was able to train and integrate the unconstitutional 
forces that were required to be integrated by the transitional arrangements of 1993. This 
internal integration was a success because of the developed institutional strength found in 
South Africa. 
Three major demographic phenomena were found to influence South African 
society. The first was the rural and urban proletariat which was created by the slow 
process of industrialization and commercialization which had taken place for the previous 
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300 hundred years and had destroyed the peasantry. Along with this development, it had 
also destroyed any foundations for ethnically based parties, as shown in the section on the 
elite. The second division was the growth of the middle class, created by the National 
Party policies of affirmative action for the Afrikaner ethnic group. Ironically, this 
development was mainly responsible for the weakening of apartheid, which the Afrikaner 
leadership had initially championed. The third was a very weakened traditional society 
because it could not support its population whose members had to migrate to urban areas 
to seek employment in commerce and industry. 
It was shown that if a political party has the opportunity to capture a traditional 
ethnic community, which is poor and relatively ignorant, the political party can use 
intimidation and patronage to sustain itself. For South Africa, ethnicity of this kind had 
been weakened by societal modernization. The military, in turn, has not been affected by 




IV.COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. The Political Elite 
The measure used for the level of development of the political elite was the level 
of cross-ethnic voting. The leading political party in Nigeria had overwhelming support 
in only one geographical region and very little support in other regions. The high 
variance of 0. 7 demonstrates this point. Table 7 shows that the variance of the winning 
party in South Africa is much lower than that of the winning party in Nigeria. These 
figures show that South Africa has a higher level of cross-ethnic voting than Nigeria. The 
variances for the three main parties in their order of size of votes are as follows: 
Nigeria South Africa 
1. 0.7 0.4 
2. 0.3 0.3 
3. 0.3 0.2 
Range (.7-3)=0.4 (.4-2)=0.2 
Table 7: Comparison of Level of Cross-voting 
The level of national acceptability for the main party in South Africa is higher 
than that in Nigeria. If it is reasoned that the acceptability of one party is the rejection of 
another in the same country, then the differences between the variances within that 
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country is the range of that rejection. In Nigeria the rejection of the major party is double 
that of the rejection in South Africa. These variance measures help to show the level of 
political polarization in a country. Voters in South Africa were therefore less polarized 
than voters in Nigeria: consequently, there was more cross voting. 
When the political elite is polarized, each group wants to ensure that the military 
will not support the opposition. The main concern with reference to the effect of the 
political elite was whether this polarization is transferred to the military through the 
ethnic-security maps. This is what happened in Nigeria as the politicians interfered with 
rules for personnel recruitment to favor recruits from their own groups. In South Africa 
there was agreement among the elite on the integration process, and the out come was 
successful. There is a positive relationship between a low level of ethnic polarization and 
elite agreement on major national issues. Using the measure of cross voting for 
estimating the level of elite development, it is found that the South African political elite 
is more developed than the Nigerian political elite. 
2. Effect of the State 
The effect of the state was indicated by the effectiveness of the state institutions as 
measured by the level of development of the state to control politicians. The level of 
development of state institutions does affect national integration because the authorities 
can break the law to achieve ethnic advantages. Where the rule of law is weak in curbing 
this behavior, tensi~ns among ethnic groups rise, causing some groups to rebel as 
happened in Nigeria in 1966. In Nigeria, the state institutions were less developed as 
evidenced by politicians who falsified census figures for their regions and by the state that 
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did not punish offenders. Local authorities incited violence against ethnic groups from 
other regions by committing such extreme actions as confiscating their property and 
banishing them. State officials, like soldiers and policemen, participated in law breaking 
in support of ethnic-based claims. The state became very weak and could not enforce the 
law. The military as an institution was split resulting in a civil. 
South Africa showed a higher level of development of the state. The success of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which implicated and embarrassed 
politicians concerning the gross violation of human rights they had committed. Senior 
politicians including the state president, ex-presidents and senior military officials, 
testified their wrong doing and pleaded for mercy. This showed that no one was above 
the law, and the politicians' responsiveness was an acknowledgement of submission to the 
law. The ruling party tried to muzzle the release of the findings of the TRC, but the court 
ruled against them. The findings were released regardless of being unpalatable to the 
politicians. 
This high level of development of the state extended to the military. The various 
forces that comprise the SANDF were integrated under the law of defense which 
originated in 1910, and underwent amendments in 1952, 1957 and 1972. A defense force 
based on law subjects the military institution to the rule of law and to civilian control. It 
legitimizes the internal military administration and enforces discipline on the soldiers. 
Only when the military is internally . integrated can it increase its potential as an 
instrument of integrati?n. In the last six years, the SANDF raised its potential as such a 
force by passing this test. 
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The level of development of the state of Nigeria was lower than that of South 
Africa. In Nigeria most of the state institutions collapsed, and the split in the Nigerian 
military, which led to civil war, was a manifestation of the weakness of the state. The 
split was only more dramatic in the military because they possessed the means of 
violence. The results from the two cases serve to emphasize that the military is an 
instrument of the state. If one assumes that the two militaries are cohesive, South Africa 
achieved a peaceful integration because the state ensured that outcome where as Nigeria, 
military had to undergo a civil war to achieve this cohesion. 
3. Effect of Society 
The level of socio-economic development at time of transition was found to be 
higher for South Africa than for Nigeria on all relevant parameters, as shown at Table 8. 
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Nigeria South Africa 
1960 1994 
Peasants 90% of pop 30% of pop. 
Literacy 5.72% pop. 82% of pop. 
Per-capita income $130 $900 
Manufacturing 6% of GDP 22% of GDP 
Services· 33% 49% 
Mining 13% 11% 
Agriculture 54% 5.8% 
GDP $6bn $19bn 
Table S:Comparison of Socio-Economic Data 
The figures show that South Africa' economy comprised the more dynamic sectors 
such as manufacturing, while Nigeria was still basically agricultural. Economic 
development figures such as the per-capita income, Gross Domestic Product and the 
social development factors such as literacy and the size of the working class favor South 
Africa by large margins. 
At independence Nigeria was in the bottom 20 percent of the 100 poorest 
countries in the world. Poverty combined with low literacy made it easy for politicians to 
manipulate society for personal gain. It was found that intimidation and patronage were 
widely used tools for obtaining votes from the electorate. The patron-client relationships 
developed in the Nigerian society more than in South Africa. There is a close linkage 
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between a low level of development, especially literacy and poverty, on one hand, and the 
development of ethnic patron-client relationships on the other. 
It may be argued that patron-client relationships occur in all countries. While this 
is true, one may wonder why they are linked to ethnic divisions and instability in Africa. 
Clientelism is extreme in Africa to the extent of weakening bureaucratic impartiality. 
Clientelism is therefore an impediment to national integration, because the institutions 
that are supposed to constrain politicians are not functional. The low level of social 
development links such relation ships to ethnicity. When public business is conducted in 
secrecy by people from one ethnic group, those from other ethnic groups view such 
behavior as a threat. Consequently rumors substitute facts and the system runs on 
suspicion. This phenomenon proved fatal to the Nigerias' first republic. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Judging by the high level of political instability and conflicts among ethnic groups 
Africa is faced with the problem of nation building. The search for strategies for ethnic 
integration is of utmost importance. As a result of military culture and patriotic values, 
which result in superior organization, scholars have proposed the military institution as a 
possible candidate for promoting national integration. The ability of the military to 
promote national integration is affected by the political elite, the state and society. 
Observations of countries that have used the military strategy have produced mixed 
results. However, it appears that militaries in more developed countries have been more 
successful than in developing countries. 
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This study therefore set out to test the hypothesis that modernized elite, states and 
societies do impact on the ability of militaries to function as instruments of national 
integration. What the study found was that on all three variables, the political elite, the 
state and the society, the South African military interacted with higher levels of 
development in 1992-1998, than did the Nigerian military between 1960-1966. 
Consequently, the South African military had more success in integrating itself and laying 
a foundation for national integration. 
The theory established that African countries have no horizontal or vertical 
integration. It was also established that despite this fundamental weakness, African 
leaders continued to use instruments such as one-party regimes, state-sponsored cultural 
programs or monopoly of the mass media for dissemination of government propaganda in 
the name of nation building. Since politicians employ patronage or intimidation 
depending upon what they expect to succeed, nation building programs carried out in a 
political context, whether genuine or not, caused more divisions. This study has 
demonstrated that for this reason modernizing instruments employed by the central 
government fail to integrate the nation. 
A national culture, which is the most necessary ingredient for national integration, 
cannot be dictated by the state. It must be allowed to evolve with the rise in the level of 
development. The effect of the level of development on national integration means that 
the central government should concentrate more on strategies for raising the level of 
socio-economic development. Instruments such as the military cannot function well if the 
variables they interact with are at a low level of development. The military may not 
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successfully carry out tasks assigned to it if, for example, the state is weak. The 
weakness of the state is the factor that directly caused the Nigerian military to fail in those 
crucial first six years. 
In South Africa, the process of cultural adaptation that had occurred through 
socio-economic development played a role in successfully integrating its military and 
society in the first six years of majority rule. The process had started 300 years ago and 
developed as the European settlers spread their influence to the interior. One of the 
actions taken by settler regimes was to change the way of life of the indigenous 
population to make that way of life meet the requirements of capitalist development. 
National integration was never a part of a planned program, and apartheid actually 
discouraged it. Nevertheless, socio- economic development transformed the majority of 
the South African people and integrated them in a way that was even frustrating to the 
government, which wanted to see the ethnic groups. separated as much as possible. The 
example of the South African case shows that if a socio-economic transformation is set in 
motion, ethnic cultures will adapt to the transformation whether the government likes it 
br not. The model of cultural adaptation should replace that of displacement, because 
instruments of displacement cause tensions between ethnic groups, and bring about the 
kind of instability that causes secessions. 
The concrete lesson for African countries is that nation-building and social 
transformation go together. South African society was transformed by the unity of 
capitalist mining and aggressive commercialization of the land. It was transformed on the 
'anvil of gold and the hammer' of maize, in the same way that German society was 
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transformed by "iron and rye," or by "rice and capital" in Japan. Oil would probably be 
transforming Nigeria today if it were not for the level of corruption. It is also possible 
that resources like Nigerian oil may prove a drawback to development and to national 
integration if the ethnic elite spend more time fighting over the distribution of revenues. 
The link of national integration with overall socio-economic development does 
not mean that the military is therefore not important in nation building. The military 
· instrument functions successfully within the context of overall socio-economic 
transformation. It has been established that at low levels of development the military is in 
effective as an instrument of integration. At high levels of development society is 
integrated and consequently the role of institutions for national integration must be 
weakened. It seems therefore that the military is in effective at both high and low levels 
of development. However, a closer look points to a different conclusion than this. The 
strategies of African countries used the state machinery in an attempt to displace existing 
ethic cultures in pursuit of a national one. This created ethnic hostilities that spilled over 
into the military causing the military to fail as an instrument of national integration. A 
different strategy su.ch as allowing ethnic cultures to adapt to evolving circumstances may 
have produced different results. At high level of development one sees the military 
utilizing developed conditions to integrate minorities and previously disadvantaged 
groups. Looked at this way, the military may be a champion of national integration at 
both a low level of national integration and at a high level. This lesson leads us to the 
possible courses of action that African countries may take to effect national integration. 
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• African countries should explore adaptive strategies of national integration because at 
low levels of development, ethnic cohesion is still strong and tensions can rise quickly 
over national decisions that are not made in a transparent manner. Tensions will be 
reduced if each ethnic group is allowed to control its own resources as much as 
possible so that it can appreciate the strength of unity. National integration should be 
bottom up and not top down. 
• The tendency to over centralize political power under conditions of low level of 
development not only arrests that development, it also causes tensions because the 
centralized state will not efficiently allocate resources. Politicians will reward their 
clients and supporters. Over-centralization of political power in the African context 
of low level of development is the source of ethnic conflicts. The military is a direct 
victim of over-centralized power because the political elite will want to ensure the 
allegiance of the military in the exercise of authority. 
• The development of patron-client relationships starts with the selection of 
representatives to the legislature, which is supposed to be the highest pillar in the 
accountability chain. Politicians go to the masses to patronize or to intimidate in 
order to obtain votes. Africans should revisit the franchise system so that the vote is 
somehow tied to responsibility. Surely no one expects a person who has no 
responsibility to demand accountability; however it is accountability that is required 
of African leadership. Accountability is linked to national integration since, as we 
have seen in this study, the political class is an important variable in that problem. If 
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the franchise goes to responsible people, then the politicians will be forced to be 
accountable on this issue of ethnic integration and to many other issues relating to 
governance. 
• African countries should identify engines of social transformation and support them. 
Central to social transformation is the factor of a land-tenure regime that supports 
such social transformation. This means transforming the peasantry into wage earners 
on or off the land. A closer look, shows that' the South Africa peasantry was 
transformed not much differently from that of the Japanese by the state supporting the 
·forces of commercialization. Africans will have to find new ways of doing the same. 
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